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Executive Summary 
The last pieces of the new regulatory framework for regional aid are finally coming together: following 
the adoption of the new regional aid guidelines last year, Member States have been engaged in 
devising assisted area maps, the last of which were approved on 16 September 2014; and, with the 
adoption of the general block exemption regulation this year, new instruments are being designed and 
implemented. More generally, over the last year or so, the European Commission has largely 
completed the reform programme set out in the 2012 State aid modernisation initiative. 
The reach of the reforms has been considerable: almost every substantive State aid text has been 
subject to review and revision, and there have been important procedural changes, notably in relation 
to transparency and new requirements for evaluation. Overall, there has been a significant 
recalibration of policy. In some areas, the scope of compatible aid has been enlarged. By contrast, in 
the area of regional aid, there has been a significant tightening of some aspects of policy ± notably 
UHJDUGLQJVXSSRUW IRU ODUJH ILUPV LQ µF¶DUHDVDQG WKH WUHDWPHQWRI ODUJHFDVHVRIDLG LQDOO DVVLVWHG
areas. 
The cornerstone of the recent reforms is the General Block Exemption Regulation, GBER 2014-20, 
under which the Commission estimates that around three-quarters of aid measures and two-thirds of 
aid expenditure will be exempted from notification. Most regional aid measures will be based on the 
GBER, subject to the assisted area maps determined on the basis of RAG 2014-20. At the domestic 
level, the focus of activity in the latter half of 2013 and early 2014 was on the preparation of new 
assisted area maps and associated policy instruments in line with RAG 2014-20. 
There is an important interface between the RAG and the GBER. The purpose of the RAG is twofold: 
it defines the criteria for the assisted area maps; and it has a residual role as the basis for 
assessment of aid measures (whether schemes or individual aids) that do not fall within the GBER. 
However, some aspects of the interface between RAG and GBER lack clarity. A major change in the 
QHZ IUDPHZRUN LV WKH WUHDWPHQW RI DLG WR ODUJH ILUPV LQ µF¶ DUHDV 7KH DLP RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ ZDV
essentially to exclude expansion investment from eligibility, but it remains to be seen exactly what 
types of LQYHVWPHQWFDQEHVXSSRUWHG WKURXJKUHJLRQDODLG LQ µF¶DUHDV$OVR LPSRUWDQWDOOQRtifiable 
aid will be subject to the compatibility assessment in the RAG, potentially increasing the number of 
case subject to detailed scrutiny.  
Among other new developments is an emphasis on evaluation. The provision of an evaluation plan 
can now, in effect be a precondition for the approval of a regional aid schemes, and has already been 
required in one published decision, though it will generally apply only to particularly large or novel 
measures. 
An important issue that goes beyond regional aid concerns the definition of State aid. In the wake of 
the Leipzig-Halle case, considerable uncertainty surrounds the State aid relevance of public spending 
on infrastructure. Recent decisions on several German infrastructure-related regional development 
schemes have cleared some forms of intervention, but required others to be amended or to be 
notified on a case-by-case basis. 
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These developments give rise to a number of questions which can usefully be posed as the starting 
point for discussion: 
(i) +RZPXFKRIDFRQVWUDLQWDUHWKHQHZUXOHVRQVXSSRUWWRODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDV" 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VRULJLQDO LQWHQWLRQKDGEHHQWRH[FOXGHODUJHILUPVIURPHOLJLELOLW\IRUUHJLRQDO LQ µF¶
areas. This objective was ultimately watered down, enabling certain types of investment by large firms 
to be aided. How far will this possibility be used? Are the definitions sufficiently clear to 
operationalise? Will this take the form of GBER-based aid or notification? If the latter, what concerns 
are there about the compatibility assessment? 
(ii) What is the relevance of the assisted area map in the new context? 
Historically, the negotiation of the assisted area maps has been one of the most contentious aspects 
of the regional aid relations between the Commission and the Member States. The 2014-20 maps 
have been negotiated comparatively swiftly and painlessly. Is this just the result of time pressures, the 
need to adopt the maps and the higher population ceilings, or has the Commission become less 
H[FLVHGRYHUFRYHUDJHQRZWKDWVXSSRUWIRUODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVLVOLPLWHG"+RZXVHIXOLVWKHPDSRI
µF¶DUHDVFRQVLGHUHGWREHIRUGRPHVWLFSROLF\± will the higher rates for SMEs be exploited? 
(iii) 7RZKDWH[WHQWDUHGRPHVWLFSROLF\PDNHUVFRQFHUQHGDWWKHODFNRIµKDUGHGJHV¶LQ
the definition of State aid? 
The Leipzig-Halle case has caused considerable uncertainty about the scope for public authorities to 
invest in infrastructure without infringing the State aid rules. To what extent are policymakers content 
ZLWKWKHFXUUHQWVLWXDWLRQ",VWKH&RPPLVVLRQDWWHPSWWRFODULI\WKHµQRWLRQRIDLG¶ LQDQRWLFHKHOSIXO"
Does the widening of the GBER diminish the need for distinguishing between the definition of State 
aid and compatibility? 
(iv) Are the provisions on evaluation to be feared or welcomed? 
The RAG and GBER both contain provisions related to the evaluation of certain aid measures, 
SDUWLFXODUO\ ODUJHRQHV'*&RPSHWLWLRQ¶VVWDIIZRUNLQJSDSHU Lmplies a degree of homogeneity over 
the approaches to be taken to evaluating regional aid measures. Is this appropriate? To what extent 
should the effectiveness of a measure (as opposed to its competition effects) be a concern of the 
Commission? How might new requirements for evaluation affect policy? 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The last pieces of the new regulatory framework for regional aid are finally coming together: following 
the adoption of the new regional aid guidelines last year, Member States have been engaged in 
devising assisted area maps, the last of which were approved on 16 September 2014; and, with the 
adoption of the general block exemption regulation this year, new instruments are being designed and 
implemented. More generally, over the last year or so, the European Commission has largely 
completed the reform programme set out in the State aid modernisation initiative (SAM) adopted in 
2012.1 SAM aimed: 
x ³WR IRVWHUVXVWDLQDEOHVPDUWDQGLQFOXVLYHJURZWKLQDFRPSHWLWLYHLQWHUQDOPDUNHW´UHIOHFWLQJ
the ambitions of Europe 20202 
x to focus Commission ex ante scrutiny on cases with the biggest impact on the internal market 
while reinforcing Member State cooperation in enforcement; and, 
x to streamline the rules and provide for faster decision-making. 
In seeking to achieve these objectives, the reach of the reforms has been considerable: almost every 
substantive State aid text has been subject to review and revision, and there have been important 
procedural changes, notably in relation to transparency.  
Overall, there has been a significant recalibration of policy. In some areas, the scope of compatible 
aid has been enlarged; this is notably true of the Risk Finance Investment Guidelines (RFIG) adopted 
in January 2014,3 which considerably expand the criteria under which such aid can be regarded as 
compatible with the Treaty, as well as the new guidelines on R&D&I, which also specify more closely 
the circumstances in which intervention does not involve State aid at all.4 By contrast, in the area of 
regional aid, there has been a significant tightening of some aspects of policy ± notably regarding 
support for large firms in µF¶areas and the treatment of large cases of aid in all assisted areas. 
In the first half of 2014, regional aid was in something of an interregnum. The 2014-20 Regional Aid 
Guidelines (RAG 2014-20)5 were adopted in June 2013, following nearly three years of extensive 
consultation and negotiation dating back to autumn 2010.6 The guidelines were initially intended to 
enter into force on 1 January 2014, but the delays in agreeing the guidelines and the slow progress 
with the new General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) rendered this impractical. As a result, 
                                                     
1
 European Commission (2012) EU State aid modernisation ± SAM, COM(2012) 209 final, 8 May. 
2
 European Commission (2010) Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable, inclusive growth, COM(2010) 
2020 final, 3 March. 
3
 Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance investments (RFIG), OJEU C19/4 of 21 January 2014: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2014:019:0004:0034:EN:PDF  
4
 Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJEU No C198/1 of 27 June 2014, see: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2014:198:FULL&from=EN  
5
 Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-20 OJ C209/1 of 23 July 2013:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:209:0001:0045:EN:PDF  
6
 The tortuous evolution of RAG 2014-20 has been documented elsewhere and is not rehearsed here, but see: 
Wishlade, F. (2013) Draft Regional Aid Guidelines 2014-20 ± Revised Data and Insights from the EP debate, 
EPRC Policy Briefing, April 2013, rev1: http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/news/Policy_Briefing_Apr_2013.pdf; 
Wishlade, F (2013) Draft Regional aid guidelines 2014-20: what are the proposals and how might they affect 
regional policies in the Member States? EPRC Policy Briefing, March 2013: 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/news/Policy_Briefing_Mar_2013.pdf:LVKODGH)¶1RQ-Paper: Non-Starter or 
Non-Negotiable? EU Competition Policy and Regional Aid Control Post-¶(XURSHDQ3ROLF\5HVHDUFK
Papers, No 83, University of Strathclyde: http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_83.pdf 
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RAG 2014-20 provided for an extension of the 2007-13 Regional Aid Guidelines7 to end June 2014 to 
dovetail with the entry into force of the new GBER.8 This meant that existing assisted area maps and 
notified aid schemes had to be re-notified for a further six months, though their approval was 
essentially a rubber-stamping exercise. Meanwhile, at the domestic level, the focus of activity in the 
latter half of 2013 and early 2014 was on the preparation of new assisted area maps and associated 
policy instruments in line with RAG 2014-20. 
The cornerstone of the recent reforms is the General Block Exemption Regulation, GBER 2014-20, 
which involves both substantive and procedural changes.9 The scope of the GBER is enlarged to 
include a number of new categories of support following the adoption of a new Enabling Regulation10 
and more flexibility is introduced in areas that were already covered. The Commission estimates that 
around three-quarters of aid measures and two-thirds of aid expenditure will be exempted from 
notification by GBER 2014-20.11 In practice, most regional aid measures will be based on the GBER, 
subject to the assisted area maps determined on the basis of RAG 2014-20. There is, however, an 
important interface between the two documents: regional aid measures not falling within the scope of 
the GBER will be assessed on the basis of the RAG.  
Following on from the State aid modernisation initiative, the Commission made a commitment to 
FODULI\ WKH µQRWLRQ¶ RI 6WDWH DLG This took the form of a draft notice,12 which was subject to 
consultation,13 and which has still to be finalised, though clarifying the concept is not wholly within the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VJLIt since the ultimate arbiter is the European Court. Nevertheless, the widely-perceived 
need for such a document is testament to the elusive (and evolving) nature of the definition of State 
aid reflected, among other things, in the fall-RXWIURPWKH&RXUW¶V decision in the Leipzig-Halle airport 
case and its implications for infrastructure investment.  
Against this background, this paper begins by setting out the main implications for regional aid arising 
from RAG 2014-20 and GBER 2014-20 (Section 2). Section 3 outlines the criteria for the assisted 
area maps while Section 4 provides an overview of Member State approaches to area designation. 
Section 5 reflects on recent developments in the relationship between State aid and support for 
infrastructure. Section 6 identifies some questions as a basis for discussion. 
                                                     
7
 Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007->@2-&KHUHDIWHUµ5$*-¶ 
8
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with 
the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJEU No L187/1 of 26 June 2014, 
KHUHDIWHUµ*%(5-¶ 
9
 A new agricultural block exemption regulation (ABER) ± Commission Regulation 702/2014 was also adopted in 
June 2014 and applies from 1 July 2014: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0702&from=en. The block exemption for the aquaculture and fisheries 
sector (FIBER) expired on 30 June 2014 and a new text is currently under preparation. 
10
 Council Regulation 733/2013 amending Regulation 994/98 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of horizontal State aid OJEU L204/11, 31 July 
2013: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:204:0011:0014:EN:PDF  
11
 Rapid Press Release (2014) State aid: Commission exempts more aid measures from prior notification, 21 
May 2014: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-587_en.htm  
12
 European Commission (2014) Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 
107(1)TFEU, see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_aid_notion/index_en.html  
13
 This closed on 31 March 2014 
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2. THE ARCHITECTURE OF REGIONAL AID CONTROL: RAG 2014-
20 AND GBER 2014-20 
As with RAG 2007-13, RAG 2014-20 fulfils two main functions: first, it sets out the parameters for the 
regional aid maps and associated aid values; second, it sets out the criteria for assessing measures 
that are not exempted under the GBER and are therefore subject to notification. As now, most 
measures will be covered by the GBER so will not require notification. However, given the residual 
scope of the RAG,14 the precise contours of those measures requiring notification are determined by 
the GBER. The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the different dimensions of regional aid 
control under the two documents; spatial coverage is dealt with separately in Section 3. 
2.1 General scope 
The GBER sets out common provisions (Chapter I), that apply to all categories of aid; Chapter II 
specifies the monitoring and reporting requirements for the Regulation as a whole; and Chapter III 
stipulates the criteria to be met for each category of aid subject to an exemption ± Section 1 in the 
case of regional aid.  
Under the common provisions, the GBER ceases to apply to regional investment aid schemes15 after 
six months ZKHUHWKHDQQXDOEXGJHWH[FHHGV¼PLOOLRQ.16 However, the Commission may decide to 
extend cover under the GBER, having assessed the evaluation plan submitted by the Member State 
within 20 days of the entry into force of the scheme.17 An earlier draft of the GBER had proposed a 
limit RI¼PLOOLRQand a ceiling of 0.01 percent of GDP, above which schemes would require formal 
notification, but this proposal met with considerable opposition and was diluted in the final version, 
though it is still not widely welcomed. The significance of this provision is that, if the Commission is 
not satisfied with the evaluation plan, then the measure falls outside the scope of the GBER after six 
months. This in turn means that the scheme requires formal notification and approval, prior to 
implementation, enabling the Commission to attach specific conditions or time limits in relation to the 
operation of the scheme related, among other things, to the evaluation of the scheme.  
Export-related activities ± ie. those linked to quantities exported or to the setting-up and running of 
distribution networks, are also excluded from the GBER, as is aid contingent on the use of domestic 
over imported goods.18 
To fall within the scope of the GBER, schemes must explicitly exclude the possibility of paying aid to a 
firm that is subject to a recovery order; ad hoc aid to such firms is also excluded from the GBER,19 as 
is aid to firms in difficulty.20 
                                                     
14
 RAG 2014-20, para 21. 
15
 This provision does not apply to GBER exempted regional operating aid schemes. 
16
 Not all categories of aid are subject to the budget limit.  
17
 GBER 2014-20, Article 1(2)(a)-(b).  
18
 GBER 2014-20, Article 1(2)(c)-(d). 
19
 GBER 2014-20, Article 1(4)(a)-(b). 
20
 GBER 2014-20, Article 1(4)(c). 
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Aid which entails a non-severable violation of EU law: notably in relation to location of headquarters, 
obligation to use domestically-produced good or restrictions on the exploitation of RD&I results in 
other Member States, falls outside the GBER.21 
Also excluded from the GBER is regional aid that appears to support relocation through µVXEVLG\
VKRSSLQJ¶ WKDW LV, aid to an undertaking that has closed down a similar activity in the EEA in the 
preceding two years, or which has concrete plans to do so within two years of the investment for 
which aid is sought.22 
Table 1: General scope of the RAG and GBER 
Excluded under the GBER RAG provisions 
$IWHUPRQWKVVFKHPHVZLWKEXGJHWV!¼Nunless 
notified evaluation plan is approved (Art. 1(2)(a)-(b)). 
Not explicit, but were GBER cover to expire after 6 
months, the scheme would require to be suspended 
until Commission approval were received, following 
notification. Approval could be time limited and/or 
made conditional on evaluation (paras 27, 142-4) 
Export related aid (Art. 1(2)(c)-(d)). 
Not explicit but intra-EU exports cannot be aided; 
owing to WTO rules, the Commission would not 
approve notified aid that supports exports to third 
countries. 
Aid to firms subject to a recovery order (Art 1(4)(a)-(b)). Not excluded, but the Commission will take account of the amount of aid still to be recovered (para 19). 
Aid to firms in difficulty (Art 1(4)(c)). Also excluded (para 18). 
Aid which entails a non-severable violation of EU law 
(Art 1(5)(a)-(c)). 
Not explicit, but the Commission would not approve aid 
that violated EU law. 
Aid linked to relocation (Art. 13(d)). 
Not per se H[FOXGHGEXW³«LIWKHUH is a causal link 
between the aid and the relocation this will constitute a 
negative effect that is unlikely to be compensated for 
E\DQ\SRVLWLYHHOHPHQWV´SDUD 
2.2 Sectoral coverage 
Like RAG 2007-13, RAG 2014-20 excludes the possibility of regional aid to steel and synthetic fibres23 
and does not apply where specific sectoral provisions are made under the Treaty.24 RAG 2014-20 
does not apply to airports or to the energy sector, which are dealt with under specific guidelines.25 On 
the other hand, regional aid can be used for the development of broadband networks, provided that 
the criteria under the Broadband Aid Guidelines26 are met, as well as research infrastructure, on 
condition that access to this infrastructure is transparent and non-discriminatory.27 Aid to shipbuilding 
falls within the scope of RAG 2014-20,28 following the expiry of sector-specific rules at the end of 
2013,29 but is excluded from the GBER; a regional aid scheme including the shipbuilding sector would 
                                                     
21
 GBER 2014-20, Article 1(5)(a)-(c)). 
22
 GBER, Article 13(d). 
23
 RAG 2014-20, para 9. 
24
 Notably fisheries and aquaculture, agriculture and transport ± RAG 2014-20, para 10. 
25
 RAG 2014-20, para 11; Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJEU C99/3 of 4 April 2014: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2014:099:FULL&from=EN and Guidelines on State aid for 
environmental protection and energy 2014-20, OJEU C200/1 of 28 June 2014: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014XC0628(01)&from=EN  
26
 EU guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, 
OJEU C25/1 of 26 January 2013: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:025:0001:0026:EN:PDF  
27
 RAG 2014-20, para 12-13. 
28
 RAG 2014-20, footnote 9. 
29
 Framework on State Aid to Shipbuilding [2011] OJ C364/9. 
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therefore have to be notified and assessed on the basis of the RAG. Aid for the coal sector is 
excluded from the GBER, but not from the RAG. Also, aid for transport and related infrastructure is 
excluded from the GBER, but, airports aside, transport infrastructure is not explicitly excluded from 
the RAG.  
Table 2: Sectoral scope of RAG and GBER 
 Excluded under RAG Regional aid excluded under GBER,  
General 
x Steel, synthetic fibres (para 9); 
x Fisheries & aquaculture, agricultural 
production, transport (para 10) 
x Airports, energy sector (para 11) 
x Fishery and aquaculture (Art. 1.3(a)) 
x Agriculture production (Art. 1.3(b)) 
x Processing and marketing of agricultural 
products where aid is related to the quantity 
of produced or conditional on being passed 
to producers (Art. 1.3(c)) 
x Closure of uncompetitive coalmines (Art. 
1.3(d)) 
x Steel, coal, shipbuilding synthetic fibres, 
transport and related infrastructure, energy 
generation, distribution and infrastructure 
(art. 13(a)) 
x Sector-specific schemes (other than 
tourism, broadband, processing & 
marketing of agricultural products) 
(Art.13.(b))) 
Transport 
aid x General exclusions above. 
x General exclusions above, plus: 
x Production, processing, marketing of 
agricultural products (Art.13.c.(i)) 
x Agriculture, forestry & fishing; mining & 
quarrying; electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply (Art.13.c.(ii)) 
x Transport of goods by pipeline 
(Art.13.c.(iii)) 
Operating 
aid 
x General exclusions above, plus: finance & 
insurance; intragroup activities; business & 
other management consultancy (para 17). 
x General exclusions above, plus finance & 
insurance; intragroup activities; business & 
other management consultancy (Art 13(e)) 
 
2.3 Forms of aid 
2.3.1 Transparent aid measures 
GBER 2014- RQO\ DSSOLHV WR µWUDQVSDUHQW¶ DLG WKDW LV DLG ZKHUH it is possible to calculate in 
advance the gross grant equivalent without undertaking a risk assessment.30 Accordingly, the 
following are considered transparent:31 
x Aid comprised in grants and interest rate subsidies 
x Aid comprised in loans where the gross grant equivalent has been calculated on the basis of 
the prevailing reference rate  
x Aid comprised in guarantees where: 
o Either the gross grant equivalent has been calculated on the basis of the safe 
harbours premiums in the Commission notice32 
                                                     
30
 GBER 2014-20, Article 5. 
31
 This list is not exhaustive, but covers the main forms relevant to regional policy 
32
 Commission notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of 
guarantees, OJ C155/10 of 20 June 2008: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008XC0620(02)&from=EN  
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o Or where the Commission has already explicitly accepted the method proposed by 
the Member State for calculating the aid element in guarantees.33 
x Aid in the form of tax advantages where there is a cap on the amount so that the ceilings is 
not breached 
x Regional urban development measures that meet the criteria set out in GBER Article 16 ± 
essentially EU Structural and Investment Fund co-financed schemes, similar to JESSICA in 
2007-13. 
x Aid in the form of risk finance for SMEs which meets the criteria set out in GBER Article 21. 
Aid which is not considered transparent does not meet the criteria of the GBER and, in the case of 
regional aid, would therefore fall to be assessed on the basis of RAG 2014-20. 
2.3.2 Aid schemes and ad hoc aid 
Unlike its predecessor, GBER 2014-20 includes all ad hoc aid within its scope (provided that the 
relevant conditions are met).34 Under GBER 2007-13, ad hoc regional investment aid only fell with the 
scope of the exemption where it supplemented aid offered under a scheme and did not exceed 50 
percent of the total amount of aid offered35 ± this would cover a situation in which a grant was offered 
under GBER-exePSWVFKHPHRIIHUHGIRUH[DPSOHE\DQDWLRQDODJHQF\DQGVXSSOHPHQWHGE\µRQH-
RII¶ VXSSRUW IURP VD\ D ORFDO HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW DJHQF\ +RZHYHU LW DOVR meant that aid 
measures which met the criteria in every way, except that they were not offered on the basis of an aid 
scheme, had to be notified individually. In 2007-13, in the case of Poland, where aid decisions were 
EDVHGRQ LQGLYLGXDO µRUGLQDQFHV¶ rather than aid schemes, a number of ad hoc measures had to be 
notified even though they would have been exempted on the basis of the GBER if the legal basis had 
been in the form of an aid scheme. GBER 2014-20 largely removes this distinction between ad hoc 
aid and aid schemes. However, ad hoc aid to large firms must meet additional conditions in relation to 
the so-FDOOHGµLQFHQWLYHHIIHFW¶36  
Aid must have an incentive effect in order to be covered by the GBER. In general, aid is considered to 
have an incentive effect if the beneficiary has submitted a written application for the aid before work 
on the project or any activity starts. This application must contain at least: the name and size of the 
undertaking; a description of the project, including the start and end date; location of the project; list of 
project costs; and type of aid and amount of public funding needed.  
Ad hoc aid to large firms must fulfil additional conditions in relation to incentive effect.37 In the case of 
regional investment aid, the Member State must also verify documentation provided by the beneficiary 
which demonstrates that the project would not have been carried out in the area considered or would 
not have been sufficiently profitable for the beneficiary in the area concerned in the absence of aid. 
This is, in effect, a relaxation of the conditions in relation to incentive effect since it now applies only to 
ad hoc aid to large firms (where previously it applied to regional aid schemes), and the conditions 
                                                     
33
 Methods may be notified by Member States and, once approved, can be used for relevant schemes under the 
GBER. See for example, from the period to end 2013, State aid N 185/2008 Austria ± methodology to calculate 
the aid element of guarantees, K(2009) 1473 final, Brussels 24 March 2009: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/225180/225180_937737_37_1.pdf  
34
 GBER 2014-20, Article 3.  
35
 GBER 2008-13, Article 13(1).  
36
 GBER 2014-20, Article 6. 
37
 GBER 2014-20, Article 6(3). 
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governing the use of ad hoc aid itself are eased compared to GBER 2008-13. The Commission had 
initially sought to tighten the requirements to prove that aid was altering the investment decisions of 
large firms in the case of aid schemes. These requirements were already present in GBER 2008-13, 
though often thought by awarding bodies to be unworkable. However, the Commission view did not 
prevail and the additional incentive effect criteria only apply to ad hoc aid to large firms, while only the 
µIRUPDO¶FULWHULDKDYHWREHFRPSOLHGZLWKIRUDLGVFKHPHVHYHQLQWKHFDVHRIODUJHILUPV 
2.3.3 Type of aid 
So-called operating aid is not explicitly mentioned as being transparent under Article 5, however, a 
new development in GBER 2014-20 is the extension of GBER to cover certain types of operating aid 
which have until now been subject to notification and prior approval. These only apply to sparsely-
populated areas as designated under RAG 2014-2038 and Outermost regions (OMR) as identified in 
the Treaty.39 
GBER 2014-20 extends the block exemption to cover certain types of operating aid which have been 
routinely approved under RAG 2007-13.40 However, not all operating aid schemes will fall within the 
GBER and those excluded will be assessed under RAG 2014-20. Operating aid under the GBER falls 
into two main groups: 
x Transport aid in sparsely-populated areas and OMR 
x Operating aid other than transport costs in the OMR only 
Transport aid concerns the additional costs of transporting goods produced within an eligible area (a 
designated sparsely-populated region or an OMR) inside the national border of a Member State. This 
must be based on the cheapest form of transport. Aid must be objectively quantifiable in advance on 
the basis of a fixed sum or per tonne/kilometre ratio or other relevant unit. In the OMR only, eligible 
costs also include the transport of goods from their place of production to the eligible area for further 
processing. In the case of the Swedish transport scheme41 as approved under RAG 2007-13 from 
2007 to end June 2014, this would mean that the outward transport elements of the scheme would fall 
within GBER 2014-20, while the inward element, because it is restricted to OMR under the GBER, 
would require notification and prior approval from the Commission on the basis of RAG 2014-20. 
Aid for other additional operating costs, apart from transport costs, incurred as a direct result of the 
permanent handicaps faced in OMR42 is covered by GBER 2014-20 provided that: 
x The beneficiaries have their economic activity in an Outermost region 
x The annual aid amount per beneficiary under all operating aid schemes does not exceed: 
o 15 percent of the gross value-added created annually by the beneficiary in the OMR 
concerned; or 
o 25 percent of its annual labour costs in the OMR; or 
                                                     
38
 RAG 2014-20, Article 161.  
39
 Article 349 TFEU.  
40
 GBER 2014-20, Article 15. 
41
 Regional transport subsidy scheme ± State aid no 152/2007 ± Sweden: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/219384/219384_741489_8_1.pdf  
42
 Namely - remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, economic dependence on a few 
products ± see Article 349 (TFEU).  
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o 10 percent of annual turnover realised in the OMR. 
The overall amount of aid must not exceed the eligible additional costs. 
Table 3: Operating aid covered by the GBER 
 Eligibility criteria Eligible areas 
Additional transport costs 
Outward transport within the 
Member State 
Sparsely-populated areas 
OMR 
Inward transport within the Member 
State OMR 
Other operating aid 
Aid amount not exceeding: 
x 15% of GVA 
x 25% of annual labour 
costs 
x 10% of annual turnover 
OMR  
Source: GBER, Article 15. 
As already mentioned, GBER 2014-20 does not cover inward transport costs in sparsely-populated 
regions, meaning that continuation of that element of the Swedish transport scheme would require 
notification and assessment on the basis of RAG 2014-20. The GBER also does not cover the 
Norwegian social security concession, which has been the subject of notification to the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority (ESA). Following lengthy negotiations between ESA and the Norwegian 
government, focused in particular on the sectoral coverage of the scheme, the social security 
concession has been approved.43 This is discussed further below. 
2.3.4 Eligible investment projects and firm size 
7KH WUHDWPHQW RI LQYHVWPHQW DLG WR ODUJH ILUPV LQ µF¶ DUHDV KDV EHHQ D PDMRU LVVXH VLQFH '*
&RPSHWLWLRQILUVWIORDWHGSURSRVDOVIRU5$*UHIRUPLQLWVµQRQ-SDSHU¶44 These proposals involved 
DFRPSOHWHEDQRQDLGWRODUJHILUPVLQWKHµF¶DUHDV7KLVZDVDUJXDEO\WKHPRVWFRQWHQWLRXVDVSHFWRI
the reform proposals and two joint letters to Commissioner Almunia attracted support from the 
PDMRULW\RIFRXQWULHVZLWKD OHDVWVRPH µF¶DUHDFRYHUDJH ,QDGGLWLRQ WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V LQLWLDO RAG 
proposals were the subject of intensive bilateral lobbying from a number of quarters. 
RAG 2014-20 and GBER 2014-20 ultimately pulled back from the complete ban on investment aid to 
ODUJH ILUPV LQ µF¶ DUHDV EXW QRQHWKHOHVV LPSRVH VRPH YHU\ VLJQLILFDQW FRQVWUDLQWV RQ DLGLQJ VXFK
LQYHVWPHQWUHIOHFWLQJWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRQFHUQWRIRFXVDLGRQFDVHVZKHUHLWLVSHUFHLved to have 
an incentive effect.  
Under GBER 2014-20, aid to large enterprises LQ µF¶ DUHDV µshall only be granted for an initial 
investment in favour of new economic activity in the area concerned.¶45 
$FFRUGLQJWRWKH*%(5µLQLWLDOLQYHVWPHQWLQIDYRXURI QHZHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\¶PHDQV46 
                                                     
43
 EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision of 18 June 2014 on regionally differentiated social security contributions 
2014-20 (Norway), Decision 225/14 COL: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-
_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf  
44
 This was not published, but see: :LVKODGH)¶1RQ-Paper: Non-Starter or Non-Negotiable? EU 
Competition Policy and Regional Aid Control Post-¶(XURSHDQ3ROLF\5HVHDUFK3DSHUV1R8QLYHUVLW\RI
Strathclyde: http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_83.pdf 
45
 GBER 2014-20, Article 14(3).  
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(a) In investment in tangible and intangible assets related to the setting up of a new 
establishment, or to the diversification of the activity of an establishment, under condition 
that the new activity is not the same or a similar activity to the activity previously 
performed in the establishment; 
(b) The acquisition of the assets belonging to an establishment that has closed down or 
would have closed down had it not been purchased, and is bought by an investor 
unrelated to the seller, under the condition that the new activity to be performed using the 
acquired assets is not the same or a similar activity to the activity performed in the 
establishment prior to its acquisition. 
)XUWKHU µWKH VDPH RU VLPLODU DFWLYLW\¶ PHDQV DQ DFWLYLW\ falling under the same class (four digit 
numerical codes) of the NACE classification of activities.47 In practice, the NACE classification seems 
rather ill-suited to this task favouring, as it does, traditional activities for which the breakdown is much 
more fine-grained, over new products and services. Table 4 serves to illustrate this point.  
Table 4: Examples of four-digit NACE classes 
Four digit NACE code Activity description 
14.11 Manufacture of leather clothes 
14.12 Manufacture of workwear 
14.13 Manufacture of other outerwear 
14.14 Manufacture of underwear 
14.19 Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories 
14.20 Manufacture of articles of fur 
14.31 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted hosiery 
14.39 Manufacture of other knitted and crocheted apparel 
21.20 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 
26.20 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 
26.40 Manufacture of consumer electronics 
63.11 Data processing, hosting and related activities 
Source: Statistical Classification of economic activities in the European Community, NACE Rev. 2, see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-07-015/EN/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF  
While some elements of the rules are the subject of specific definitions, others are not. For example, 
WRZKDWGRHVµWKHDUHDFRQFHUQHG¶UHIHU"7KHGUDIW*%(5KDGVSHFLILHGWKDWWKHµQHZHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶
had to be in a different NUTS 3 region from any existing operations of the firm, but this requirement 
has been dropped. On the other hand:  
µDQ\LQLWLDOLQYHVWPHQWVWDUWHGE\WKHVDPHEHQHILFLDU\DWJURXSOHYHOZLWKLQDSHULRGRIWKUHH
years of the date of start of works on another aided investment in the same [NUTS 3 region] 
VKDOOEHFRQVLGHUHGWREHSDUWRIDVLQJOHLQYHVWPHQWSURMHFW¶ 
µ(VWDEOLVKPHQW¶ LV KRZHYHU SUHVXPDEO\ GLIIHUHQW IURP µLQYHVWPHQW SURMHFW¶ and as a result, the 
JHRJUDSKLFDOVFRSHRIµDUHD¶LVXQFOHDU LQWKHFRQWH[WRIDµQHZHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶ 
Related, WKH QRWLRQ RI µHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶ LV QRW GHILQHG What functions would need to be carried out 
within operation in order to constitute an µestablishment¶, and accordingly, when does an operation 
EHFRPH D µQHZ HVWDEOLVKPHQW¶ (aid to which falls within the GBER) rather than an extension of an 
                                                                                                                                                                     
46
 GBER 2014-20, Article 2(51). 
47
 GBER 2014-20, Article 2(50). 
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existing one (which does not?) These definitional issues are important since they determine the 
circumstances in which a project can be aided with GBER cover. 
Table 5: Eligible project types by firm size, region and basis for eligibility 
 60(VµD¶DQGµF¶UHJLRQV /DUJHILUPVLQµD¶
regions /DUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDV 
Setting-up new 
establishment GBER GBER GBER 
Extension of the capacity 
of an existing 
establishment 
GBER GBER Incompatible 
Diversification into 
products not previously 
produced 
GBER GBER RAG? (para 15, 24) 
Fundamental change in 
the overall production 
process 
GBER GBER RAG? (para 15) 
Acquisition of assets of an 
establishment that has 
closed or would have 
closed 
GBER GBER Incompatible 
Acquisition of assets of an 
establishment that has 
closed, or would have 
closed, on condition of 
diversification into new 
activities that are not the 
same or similar 
GBER GBER GBER 
Diversification of the 
activity of an 
establishment into new 
activities that are not the 
same or similar 
GBER GBER GBER 
Diversification of an 
existing establishment 
into new products or new 
process innovations 
GBER GBER RAG (para 15) 
Note: In all cases, the GBER only applies up to the adjusted aid amount.  
Under RAG 2014- UHJLRQDODLG IRU ODUJHXQGHUWDNLQJV LQ µF¶DUHDVPD\RQO\EHJUDQWHG IRU ¶LQLWLDO
LQYHVWPHQWV WKDWFUHDWHQHZHFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHV¶RU µIRU WKHGLYHUVLILFDWLRQRIH[LVWLQJHVWDEOLVKPHQWV
LQWR QHZSURGXFWVRUQHZ SURFHVV LQQRYDWLRQV¶48 This is wider than the scope of the GBER, which 
does not allow for the possibility of regional aid to large firms for new process innovations LQµF¶DUHDV
New process innovations are not defined in RAG 2014-20, though it does specify that eligible costs 
µIRU D IXQGDPHQWDO FKDQJH LQ WKH SURGXFWLRQ SURFHVV¶ PXVW H[FHHG WKH GHSUHFLDWLRQ RI WKH DVVHWV
linked to the activity to be modernised in the course of the preceding three years.49 However, it is not 
clear whether µQHZ SURFHVV LQQRYDWLRQV¶ are WKH VDPH DV µD IXQGDPHQWDl change in the production 
SURFHVV¶ 
Further ZKLOH WKH *%(5 H[HPSWV IURP QRWLILFDWLRQ DLG IRU WKH µGLYHUVLILFDWLRQ RI WKH DFWLYLW\ RI DQ
HVWDEOLVKPHQW¶50 RAG 2014- H[SOLFLWO\ UHTXLUHV WKH QRWLILFDWLRQ RI DLG µWR GLYHUVLI\ DQ H[LVWLQJ
                                                     
48
 RAG 2014-20, para 15.  
49
 RAG 2014-20, para 96. 
50
 GBER 2014-20, Article 15(3) as defined by Article 2(51)(a) 
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establishment in a µF¶ DUHD LQWR QHZ SURGXFWV¶51 In short, is there a lack of clarity surrounding the 
QRWLRQVRIµDFWLYLW\¶DQGµSURGXFW¶DQGZKHWKHUWKHWZRDUHLQIDFWLQWHUFKDQJHDEOH 
In broad terms, it can be seen that the intention of the Commission is to exclude aid for simply 
H[SDQGLQJH[LVWLQJODUJHEXVLQHVVHVLQF¶DUHDV,QSUDFWLFHKRZHYHUWKH*%(5DQGWKH5$*GRQRW
define precisely enough what is eligible; this may make operationalisation of the GBER difficult in 
certain cases, while also leaving the scope of the RAG unclear.  
2.3.5 Notification threshold 
The GBER only applies to aid amounts up to a given threshold,52 beyond which awards are subject to 
notification and a compatibility assessment on the basis of the RAG. The notification threshold varies 
according to the aid intensity applicable in the region concerned and is calculated as follows:53 
Maximum aid amount = R x (A+0.5*B+0*C), where: 
R is the maximum aid intensity in the area on the basis of the approved map, excluding the 
SME bonus 
A is the fLUVW¼0 million of eligible costs; 
B DUHWKHHOLJLEOHFRVWVEHWZHHQ¼PLOOLRQDQG¼PLOOLRQDQG 
C are the eligiEOHFRVWVRYHU¼PLOOLRQ 
In effect, the result of this formula is that, as previously, proposed aid must be notified for prior 
DSSURYDO LI LWH[FHHGV WKHDGMXVWHGDLGDPRXQWZKLFKDQHOLJLEOH LQYHVWPHQWRI¼PFRXOGREWDLQ
this corresponds to the notification thresholds set out in Table 6.  
Table 6: Notification thresholds expressed as amounts of aid against prevailing aid ceilings 
Prevailing 
ceiling 10% 15% 25% 35% 50% 
Notification 
threshold ¼P ¼P ¼P ¼P ¼m 
Source: RAG 2014-20, para 20(n). 
These notification thresholds are unchanged. However, the RAG 2007-13 market share and 
SURGXFWLRQFDSDFLW\ µVFUHHQV¶54 beyond which aid is subject to a formal investigation are dropped in 
RAG 2014-20. These screens concerned beneficiaries that had, or would have had, more than 25 
percent market share of the product concerned or projects which resulted in an increase in capacity of 
more than 5 percent (except in rapidly expanding markets).55 The abolition of the screens reflects the 
implications of the Smurfit Kappa judgment,56 but there were anyway doubts about their effectiveness 
                                                     
51
 RAG 2014-20, para 24. 
52
 GBER 2014-20, Article 4(1)(a). 
53
 GBER 2014-20, Article 2(20) 
54
 RAG 2007-13, para 68. 
55
 In practice, most of these investigations were opened because the Commission had doubts about whether the 
screens were exceeded.  
56
 In this case, the Court found that the Commission is not precluded from opening the formal procedure if the 
market share or capacity criteria are not exceeded and that, by inferring that the aid complied with the guidelines 
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and utility.57 Under RAG 2014-20, all notified aids are subject to the compatibility assessment set out 
in RAG 2014-20: there is no per se presumption of compatibility of the basis of market analysis and 
there is no explicit trigger for the opening of a formal investigation. Although this affects relatively few 
cases, the scale of the aid concerned in those cases is significant and it reflects an important 
underlying shift in philosophy. It remains to be seen what impact this will have on the likelihood of 
notification by domestic authorities and on the workload of DG Competition, particularly in the context 
of the narrower GBER FULWHULDIRUDLGWRODUJHILUPVLQµF¶ areas. 
2.4 The compatibility assessment under the Regional Aid Guidelines 
It can be anticipated that, as under RAG 2007-13, the vast majority of schemes will fall under the 
GBER; indeed, there is a powerful incentive to domestic authorities to design measures that are 
GBER compliant. Moreover, the GBER is extended to include ad hoc aid offered independently of a 
scheme At the same time, the assessment criteria under the RAG are toughened and tightened, 
creating a disincentive for policymakers to notify, and arguably contributing further to the 
homogenisation of aid policy.  
The State aid modernisation initiative (SAM)58 called for ¶common principles¶ for the compatibility of 
State aid with the Treaty. Reflecting this, aid is compatible only if it meets specified criteria.59 The 
DSSURDFK LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH µEDODQFLQJ WHVW¶ LQ RWKHU DUHDV RI 6WDWH DLG DQG WKH &RPPLVVLRQ
Guidance on aid to large investments (LIPS guidance)60 applicable under RAG 2007-13, though the 
µEDODQFLQJ¶ LV OHVV H[SOLFLW WKDQ LQ WKH LIPS guidance which it effectively replaces. In considering a 
notified measure, the Commission essentially seeks to analyse whether the positive impact of the 
measure in addressing an objective of common interest outweighs its potential negative effects on 
trade and competition. In doing so, the Commission will consider a range of criteria.  
The way in which these criteria are applied varies according to whether the notified measures are 
individual aids, investment aid schemes or operating aids. All must be met for the measure to be 
considered compatible under the balancing test: 
a) Contribution to a well-defined objective of common interest:61 investment aid schemes 
should form part of a regional development strategy (such as an EU Cohesion policy Operational 
Programme); individual aid may be justified on the basis of a variety of indicators (such as job 
creation, training, clustering effects, knowledge spillovers); Member States must demonstrate the 
existence of specific difficulties. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
because the market screens were not exceeded without assessing the importance of the project for regional 
development, the Commission had both misconstrued the scope of the guidelines and failed to exercise its 
discretion ± see Case T-304/08 Smurfit Kappa v Commission (judgment of 10 July 2012). 
57
 Kai-Uwe Kühn (2012) Making State Aid Rules More Effective: the Reform of the Regional Aid Guidelines, 10th 
annuaO([SHUWV¶IRUXPRQ(XURSHDQ6tate Aid Law, Brussels, 7 June; Friederiszick, H. and Tosini, N. (2013) 
Implications of the State aid Modernisation for the Assessment of Large Investment Projects, European State Aid 
Law Quarterly, 1, pp46-60. 
58
 European Commission (2012) EU State aid modernisation ± SAM, COM(2012) 209 final, 8 May. 
59
 RAG 2014-20, para 26. 
60
 Communication from the Commission concerning the criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid to 
large investment projects [2009] OJ C 223/3. 
61
 RAG 2014-20, para 30-46. 
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b) Need for state intervention:62 it is sufficient that projects are located within the assisted area 
map, this being a reflection of the fact that the market is not delivering the Cohesion objective. 
c) Appropriateness:63 a notified aid measure will not be considered compatible if less distortive 
instruments or aid types can achieve the same positive contribution to regional development. The 
onus is on Member States to demonstrate the appropriateness of the aid proposed, including a 
consideration of forms of aid considered to be less distortive. 
d) Incentive effect:64 aid is only compatible if it alters the behaviour of the beneficiary. Member 
States must use a standard application form and applicants must explain what would have 
happened in the absence of aid; large firms must provide documentary evidence in support of the 
counterfactual described. Aid will be considered to have an incentive effect if it results in 
additional activity that the beneficiary would not carry out without aid or would do so on a smaller 
scale or in a different location. For notifiable individual aid, incentive effect can be proven in two 
possible scenarios: (i) the investment would not take place at all without the aid because it would 
not be sufficiently profitable for the beneficiary (investment decision); or (ii) the investment would 
not take place in that location without aid because aid is required to compensate for the net 
disadvantages and costs in the assisted area (location decision). This seems likely to be the most 
difficult criterion to meet in the assessment. There are comparatively onerous documentation 
requirements to establish the counterfactual ± ie. what the undertaking would have done in the 
absence of aid. On the other hand, it is not wholly convincing that a firm would rely on regional aid 
to render a project profitable when the approval of the aid was dependent on a potentially lengthy 
assessment process by the Commission. 
e) Proportionality:65 Member States must ensure that aid is limited to the minimum needed. For 
notified aid schemes available to large firms and individual aid to large firms this is based on the 
µQHWH[WUDFRVWDSSURDFK¶± meaning that aid must be limited to the additional cost of the project in 
the area concerned, compared to the counterfactual, in the absence of aid. For SMEs, the aid 
ceilings specified in RAG 2014-RIIHUDµVDIHKDUERXU¶ 
f) Avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and trade:66 the negative effects on 
trade and competition must be limited and outweighed by the contribution to the objective of 
common interest. Nevertheless, the RAG outlines three instances where the negative effects 
µPDQLIHVWO\¶RXWZHLJKWKHSRVLWLYHLPSDFWDQGQRWLILHGLQGLYLGXDODLGFDQQRWEHIRXQGFRPSDWLEOHL
where the project creates capacity in a market that is in structural decline; (ii) where, without the 
aid, the project would have located in a region where the aid maximum is the same or higher and 
(iii) where there is a link between aid and relocation.  
g) Transparency:67 Member States must publish on a single website the text of notified measures 
and specified information on beneficiaries. 
RAG 2014-20 only applies to aid schemes intended to be implemented after 30 June 2014.68 As such, 
there are as yet no published European Commission decisions with RAG 2014-20 as their basis, 
other than those relating to the assisted area maps for the new period. However, the EFTA 
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 RAG 2014-20, para 47-49. 
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Surveillance Authority has published its decision69 to approve regionally-differentiated social security 
contributions in Norway for 2014-20. The decision is based on the ESA Guidelines on Regional Aid,70 
which are analogous to RAG 2014-20 for the sectors covered by the EEA agreement.71  
The Norwegian social security concession is distinctive in several respects. First, it constitutes 
regional operating aid, which is rarely approved under the regional aid rules and then only in closely-
defined circumstances. Second, assisted areas for operating aid are different from those for 
investment aid ± they are not based on the population ceilings or designation criteria set out in the 
RAG, but rather subject to a separate assessment by the Commission, or, in this case, ESA. Third, 
the scheme is extremely large ± annual spend is around NOK 13 billion ± VRPH¼ELOOLRQRIZKLFK
around half is accounted for by undertakings engaged in economic activities. In other words, about 
¼PLOOLRQLQYROYHV6WDWHDLGZLWKWKHUHPDinder accounted for by, for example, public sector bodies 
not engaged in economic activities, and therefore not State aid recipients.  
The rather anodyne text of ESA decision conceals a considerable amount of controversy over the 
approval of the scheme. Perhaps surprisingly, given recent population trends in Norway, the 
controversy did not concern the assisted area coverage of the scheme. The Norwegian authorities 
proposed an increase in coverage compared to 2007-13, with the population rising from 17.7 
percent72 to 21.1 percent of the population and the assisted area map proposals proved 
uncontentious. By contrast, the sectoral focus of the scheme was the subject of intense negotiations. 
The previous scheme (2007-2013) had been available to all sectors of activity, with the exception of 
steel and shipbuilding.73 The new scheme was made subject to the sectoral restrictions introduced 
under RAG 2014-20 ± see Table 2± most notably the exclusion of the transport and energy sectors, 
but also the financial and insurance sectors. These had hitherto been eligible on the basis of the 
µKRUL]RQWDO¶ QDWXUH RI WKH VFKHPH 7KH 1RUZHJLDQ DXWKRULWLHV DUJXHG YLJRURXVO\ IRU WKH KRUL]RQWDO
approach to be maintained and for precise definitions of the sectors subject to limitations under the 
RAG and GBER.74  
This approach was rejected by ESA, in league with the Commission, but ESA did specify more closely 
which sectors would be ineligible.75 These are: 
x Steel76 
x Synthetic fibres77 
x Transport ± namely, the transport of passengers by aircraft, maritime transport, road or rail 
and by inland waterway or freight transport services for hire or reward, ie.78 
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 EFTA Surveillance authority Decision of 18 June 2014 on regionally-differentiated social security contributions 
2014-20 (Norway), Dec no: 225/14/COL: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/225-14-COL.pdf  
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 The EEA Agreement does not cover the common agriculture and fisheries policies.  
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73
 EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION of 19 July 2006 on the notified scheme concerning regionally 
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o NACE 49: land transport and transport via pipelines, excluding: NACE 49.32 taxi 
operation; NACE 49.42 removal services; and NACE 49.5 transport via pipeline 
o NACE 50: water transport 
o NACE 51: air transport, excluding NACE 51.22 space transport.  
x Airports79 
x Energy ± here the ESA decision refers to the GBER, noting the definition of the energy sector 
DV ³HQHUJ\ JHQHUDWLRQ WUDQVPLVVLRQ DQG LQIUDVWUXFWXUH´ 2Q WKLV EDVLV LW FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKH
entire NACE division 35 should be excluded.80 
x Financial and insurance activities (NACE Section K).81 
x Undertakings performing intra-group activities and whose principal activity falls under NACE 
classes 70.10.82 
The compatibility assessment itself appears rather mechanistic, though the substance of the 
underlying discussions is not always easy to discern. In the context of proportionality, for example, the 
decision appears simply to accept the rates proposed by the Norwegian authorities (which are 
themselves rolled forward from 20107-13) without attempting explicitly to calibrate these with regional 
disparities. 
More noteworthy are the conditions attached to the evaluation of the scheme. This must be delivered 
to ESA by end 2018 and quite stringent criteria are associated with the goals and conduct of the 
evaluation. This is discussed in more detail below. 
2.5 Award values 
RAG 2014-20 reduces aid intensities across the board, except for the very poorest regions and the 
sparsely-populated areas. The main maximum aid intensities are shown in Table 7, though actual 
intensities on the approved maps may differ. 
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 This corresponds to the definition in GBER 2014-20, Article 2(45).  
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 RAG 2014-20, para 11. 
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 Section 35 includes the activity of providing electric power, natural gas, steam, hot water and the like through a 
permanent infrastructure (network) of lines, mains and pipes. The dimension of the network is not decisive; also 
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economic activities in the European Community, NACE Rev. 2, see: 
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 RAG 2014-20, para 17. 
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Table 7: RAG 2014-20 Maximum aid inteQVLWLHVµVWDQGDUG¶PDWUL[JURVVJUDQW-equivalent 
 Large firms Medium-sized firms Small firms 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3per head <45% EU27 av. 50% 60% 70% 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3per head < 60% EU27 av. 35% 45% 55% 
µD¶UHJLRQV*'3per head <75% EU27 av 25% 35% 45% 
µF¶DUHDV± ex µD¶UHJLRQVXQWLO 15% 25% 35% 
µF¶DUHDV± sparsely populated/border 15% 25% 35% 
µF¶DUHDV 10% 20% 30% 
Note: (i) $VGLVFXVVHGDLGWRODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVLVUHVWULFWHGWRFHUWDLQW\SHVRILQYHVWPHQWVRWKDWLQSUDFWLFH
a zero rate will often apply. (ii) Rates for OMRs are increase by up to 20 percent for those with GDP per head at 
or below 75 percent of the EU average and 10 percent for the remainder. (iii) ,QµF¶DUHDVDW1876RUEHORZ
WKDW DUH DGMDFHQW WR µD¶ DUHDV, the aid intensity may be increased so that the differential does not exceed 15 
percentage points.  
Source: RAG 2014-20, para 171-177. 
As under RAG 2007-13, regional aid for large investments, defined as projects with eligible 
H[SHQGLWXUHH[FHHGLQJ¼P LVVXEMHFW WRDQDGMXVWHGDLGDPRXQW7KLV LVVHW out in Table 8; SME 
bonuses do not apply to large investment projects irrespective of firm size.83 
Table 8$GMXVWHGDLGDPRXQWVIRUHOLJLEOHLQYHVWPHQWH[FHHGLQJ¼P 
Eligible expenditure  Aid ceiling 
8SWR¼P 100% of applicable aid ceiling 
For the SDUWEHWZHHQ¼PDQG¼P 50% of applicable aid ceiling 
)RUWKHSDUWH[FHHGLQJ¼P 34% of applicable aid ceiling 
Source: RAG 2014-20, para 20(c). 
As is evident from Table 8 ZKHUH HOLJLEOH SURMHFW FRVWV H[FHHG ¼ PLOOLRQ the full aid intensity 
applicable in the region cannot be applied and the aid rate is adjusted. As already mentioned 
proposed aid must be notified for a compatibility assessment and prior approval if it exceeds the 
DGMXVWHG DLG DPRXQW ZKLFK DQ HOLJLEOH LQYHVWPHQW RI ¼P FRXOG REWDin; this corresponds to the 
notification thresholds set out in Table 6 above.  
Importantly, notified aid to large firms must be limited to the minimum necessary to induce the 
LQYHVWPHQW WR WDNH SODFH FDOFXODWHG RQ D µQHW H[WUD FRVW¶ EDVLV LQ RUGHU WR IXOfil the proportionality 
criterion under the compatibility assessment. The rates illustrated in Figure 1 therefore act as a cap 
on the minimum necessary. For SME aid under notified schemes, the rates in Table 7 DFWDV µVDIH
KDUERXUV¶± at or below these levels, the proportionality criterion is deemed to be fulfilled. 
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Figure 1: Adjusted aid intensities by maximum rate and eligible expenditure 
 
Note: The initial rates vary according to the maximum aid intensity for the region, then decline for eligible 
H[SHQGLWXUHVRYHU¼PLOOLRQZKHUHWKHSURSRVHGDLGDPRXQWLVKLJKHUWKDQWKDWIRUZKLFKD¼PLOOLRQHOLJLEOH
LQYHVWPHQWZRXOGTXDOLI\ ¼PLOOLRQ LQDSHUFHQWDUHD¼PLOOLRQ LQDSHUFHQWDUHa, etc), then aid 
must be notified. However, in any event the adjusted aid amount is a ceiling. 
Source: Calculated on the basis of RAG 2014-20, para 20(c).  
2.6 Relations between regional aid control and EU cohesion policy 
Since the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds relations between Cohesion policy and Competition 
control of regional aid have often been strained. Historically, this has been particularly so in context of 
assisted area coverage, and the lack of coincidence between the EU Cohesion policy and national 
assisted area maps. However, this has been less controversial since 2000, when Member States 
gained greater flexibility in choosing both sets of areas, and especially since 2007, when Cohesion 
policy ceased to be spatially restricted. In this context, the interface between Cohesion policy and the 
GBER is now of more relevance than relations with the RAG. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note a 
greater degree of coordination between RAG 2014-20 and the objectives of Cohesion policy. This is 
reflected in the explicit use of Cohesion policy criteria in State aid compatibility assessments and in 
the specific provisions made for territorial cooperation and regional urban aid. 
Regarding the contribution to a common objective, schemes implemented within the context of 
Cohesion policy programmes are deemed to meet this criterion, whereas for purely national or 
regional measures Member States must demonstrate how they contribute to a regional development 
strategy84 and schemes must include selection criteria that are in line with that strategy. In other 
words, there is a presumption of compatibility for Cohesion policy based measures that is not 
extended to domestic regimes. Similarly, where a scheme is introduced outwith a Cohesion policy 
programme, Member States must indicate why regional aid is an appropriate instrument and why, 
where applicable, a sectoral focus might be justified.85 By contrast, for aid schemes implementing 
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 RAG 2014-20, para 33 and Draft GBER, Article 15(3).  
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Cohesion policy programmes, the instrument proposed is considered to be appropriate without the 
need for further justification. 
The GBER makes specific provision to accommodate investments in Cohesion policy European 
Territorial Cooperation projects. This enables the rate of award applicable where the major part of 
investment occurs to apply to all partners where they would otherwise differ.86 However, the standard 
RAG 2014-20 restrictions on aid to large ILUPV LQ µF¶DUHDVVWLOODSSO\ and the practical usefulness of 
this provision may be limited by its relevance to ETC projects. Also in the context of ETC projects, the 
GBER makes specific provision for SMEs participating in cooperation projects.87 This allows for up to 
SHUFHQWRIHOLJLEOHFRVWVVXEMHFWWRDFHLOLQJRI¼PLOOLRQSHUXQGHUWDNLQJSHUSURMHFWWRIDOOZLWKLQ
the GBER. The restriction of Article 20 to SMEs is a seriously limiting factor, as is the maximum aid 
intensity, which is substantially below ETC cofinancing rates.  
GBER 2014- DGGV µUHJLRQDO XUEDQ GHYHORSPHQW DLG¶ DV DQ H[HPSWLRQ FDWHJRU\88 this was a 
relatively late addition to the text - it was not in the document on which the Commission consulted in 
May 2013. However, the exemption is only available in respect of projects that fulfil all three of the 
following criteria (as well as the general criteria of the GBER): 
x they must be implemented through urban development funds in assisted areas; 
x they must be co-financed by the EU Structural and Investment Funds; and, 
x they must support the implementation of an integrated approach to sustainable urban 
development. 
,QDGGLWLRQLWLVSURSRVHGWRFDSWKHWRWDOLQYHVWPHQWLQWRDQXUEDQGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWDW¼PLOOLRQ
It is important to note that the exemption applies only to urban development projects that are located 
in assisted areas. Two key points flow from this: first, in many countries there is not necessarily an 
overlap between the areas targeted for regional policy and those targeted for urban development; 
second, it is unclear how the eligibility restrictions on investments by large undertakings would play 
out in the context of regional urban development aid. 
More generally, the scope of this provision in the GBER is rather limited, partly owing to the spatial 
coverage restrictions limiting the exemption to the assisted areas (and associated impact on the 
elLJLELOLW\ RI ODUJH ILUPV DQG SDUWO\ GXH WR WKH RYHUDOO OLPLW RI ¼ PLOOLRQ FXUUHQWO\ SURSRVHG $V D
result, it seems probable that many JESSICA-type measures in future will either have to be structured 
in order not to contain aid or will require notification (as has been the case in 2007-13). 
2.7 Transparency 
As mentioned above, transparency obligations are included in the common assessment criteria for 
notified aid.89 These include online publication of the full text of the aid scheme, its implementing 
provisions and award data, notably names of beneficiaries, aid amounts and intensities. In principle, 
Member States were already required to provide online information on aid schemes approved under 
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the GBER, though in practice the links to such information have often been poorly maintained and the 
information limited in detail.  
Reporting was required under RAG 2007-13 for aid to all large projects (those involving investment 
H[FHHGLQJ¼PLOOLRQ LUUHVSHFWLYHRI WKHDPRXQWRIDLG5$* 2014-20 extends this to all projects 
DQGUHTXLUHVDLGDZDUGVH[FHHGLQJ¼PLOOLRQWREHUHSRUWHGWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQZLWKLQGD\VRIWKH
award.  
Under GBER 2014-20, Member States are required to develop websites providing information on the 
implementation of the GBER by 30 June 2016 - two years from the entry into force of the Regulation. 
More specifically, the GBER requires the publication on a comprehensive State aid website at 
national or regional level of: 90 
x the summary information set out in a standardised format or a link providing access to that 
information; 
x the full text of each aid measure or a link providing access to it; 
x information on each individuDODLGDZDUGH[FHHGLQJ¼ 
Early indications are that the Commission will reinforce its monitoring of compliance. 
2.8 Evaluation 
A further innovation is the emphasis on evaluation. RAG 2014-20 provides the possibility for the 
Commission to limit the validity of aid schemes to four years in order for an evaluation to be carried 
out.91 The precise terms of any requirement to undertake an evaluation92 would be defined in the 
approval of the aid measure. However, evaluations must by undertaken by experts independent from 
granting authorities, on the basis of a common methodology (which the Commission may provide) 
and must be made public. The circumstances in which an evaluation would be imposed as a condition 
of approval will be limited to those with large budgets, schemes with novel characteristics or in areas 
where significant market, technological or regulatory changes are envisaged. Evaluations must be 
carried out in sufficient time for the results to feed in to the Commission decision on any extension of 
the scheme proposed, or at expiry.93 GBER 2014-20 provides for the expiry of GBER cover after six 
months for schemes with annual EXGJHWV H[FHHGLQJ ¼ PLOOLRQ SHQGLQJ WKH DSSURYDO E\ WKH
Commission of an appropriate evaluation plan.  
There is little experience to date of what might be required either in terms of notified aid under the 
5$* ZKHUH DQ HYDOXDWLRQ KDV EHHQ LPSRVHG RU ZKDW W\SH RI µHYDOXDWLRQ SODQ¶ ZLOO VDWLVI\ WKH
Commission under GBER 2014-20. However, there are indications that this could be demanding. 
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The only published decision containing an evaluation requirement concerns the Norwegian social 
security concession approved by ESA94 this provides for quite an exhaustive evaluation designed to 
assess: 
1. The impact of the scheme on job opportunities and employment in the eligible regions, using 
results indicators that measure the impact which lowering employment costs through the 
scheme has on: 
a. Labour market participation rates 
b. Employment growth in the public and private sector 
c. Wage formation and household disposable income 
d. Industrial structure 
e. Educational level of the workforce 
f. Municipal and state finances 
The analysis is to include the effects of the scheme on the labour market by region and sector 
and assess the impact of the scheme on both undertakings and employees, in order to 
determine who benefits. 
 
2. The impact of the scheme on competition and trade, including issues related to size of 
undertaking and international competition. 
A detailed timeline for the evaluation, as well as the participation of ESA in a methodological 
workshop, is also provided for. The evaluation process is set to begin with a feasibility study in the 
first quarter of 2015 and conclude with the delivery of the evaluation to ESA by end 2018. 
GBER 2014-20 sets out the minimum requirements for an evaluation plan;95 this should set out: 
x the objectives of the aid scheme 
x evaluation questions 
x result indicators 
x the methodology envisaged 
x data collection requirements 
x proposed timing, including the date of submission of the final report 
x description of the independent body conducting the evaluation or the criteria to be used for 
selecting the evaluator 
x mechanisms for publicising the evaluation. 
A provisional supplementary information sheet for the submission of an evaluation plan has been 
prepared. Its use is not yet mandatory as this requires changes to the Implementing Regulation. 
However, its use is recommended and it refers Member States to a staff working document on a 
common methodology for evaluation.96 A version of this document had been subject to consultation at 
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 EFTA Surveillance authority Decision of 18 June 2014 on regionally-differentiated social security contributions 
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the end of 2013 and many Member States expressed concern at the ambition of the proposal and, 
more fundamentally, at the competence of the Commission to require the evaluations of the 
effectiveness of measures financed with purely domestic resources.  
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3. SPATIAL COVERAGE AND AREA DESIGNATION 
Many of the key principles underlying spatial coverage and area designation were unchanged from 
RAG 2007-13 to RAG 2014-20. However, there were some important changes of detail which affect 
countries differently. This section briefly outlines the provisions of RAG 2014-20, highlighting 
differences with RAG 2007-13, before reviewing area designation exercises in the EoRPA partner 
countries. 
3.1 Spatial coverage 
The GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµD¶UHJLRQVDQGµF¶DUHDVLVPDLQWDLQHG in RAG 2014-20 as in RAG 2007-13, 
EXWWKHGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQLVKHLJKWHQHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWDLGWRODUJHILUPVLQWKHµF¶DUHDVLVRQO\FRPSDWLEOH
LQUHVSHFWRIµLQLWLDOLQYHVWPHQWLQIavour of new eFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\¶DVGLVFXVVHGDERYH.  
The initial population ceiling set in RAG 2014-20 is 46.53 percent of the EU27 population (equivalent 
to 47 percent of the EU28 population ± i.e. following the accession of Croatia).97 This is higher in 
absolute terms than the RAG 2007-13 initial ceiling (42 percent of EU25), and leads to higher final 
coverage once all the adjustments (safety net, minimum coverage, etc. ± which all adjust coverage 
upwards) are made (see Table 9). 
The basic definition of Article 107(3)(a) regions98 - µD¶UHJLRQV -  as NUTS 2 regions with GDP(PPS) 
per head below 75 percent of the EU average is unchanged,99 but eligibility is determined with 
reference to EU27, rather than EU25. In addition, and irrespective of their level of GDP per head, the 
2XWHUPRVW UHJLRQV205 UHIHUUHG WR LQ$UWLFOH7)(8DOVRUHWDLQ µD¶VWDWXV)XUWKHUDQG LQ OLQH
with convention, the eligibility threshold was based on EU membership when the guidelines were 
DGRSWHGVRWKDWWKHGHVLJQDWLRQRI&URDWLDDVDQµD¶DUHD was based on the EU27 threshold. 
The coverage of Article 107(3)(c) areas - µF¶DUHDV - comprises two elements that are now referred to 
DV µSUHGHILQHG¶ DUHDV DQG µQRQ-SUHGHILQHG¶ DUHDV100 This is broadly as before, but importantly the 
µSUHGHILQHG¶ population cannot be transferred to other areas ± ie. it may only be used to designate 
areas that fulfil the predefined criteria.101 Countries are not obliged to designate pre-defined areas, but 
WKHHOLJLEOHSRSXODWLRQDVVRFLDWHGLVµORVW¶IURPWKHRYHUDOOWRWDOLILt is not used. 
There are two categories of SUHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDDVEHIRUHLUHJLRQVZLWKµD¶VWDWXVLQ-13 that 
are now over the 75 percent threshold;102 and (ii) sparsely populated areas.103 
)RUPHU µD¶UHJLRQV cover almost 7 percent of the EU population, and a very significant proportion of 
some countries (see Table 9). The statistical effect category in RAG 2007-13 is not retained.104 
                                                     
97
 RAG 2014-20, para 148. 
98
 RAG 2014-20, para 150. 
99
 Based on Eurostat data for 2008-10. 
100
 RAG 2014-20, para 155. 
101
 RAG 2014-20, para 159. 
102
 RAG 2014-20, para 158(a). 
103
 RAG 2014-20, para 158(b).  
104
 RAG 2007-13, para 18-20. 
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Sparsely-populated areas are defined as: NUTS 2 regions with fewer than 8 inhabitants per km2 or 
NUTS 3 regions with fewer than 12.5 inhabitants per km2.105 This differs from the RAG 2007-13 
definition, which refers only to the NUTS 3 based element of the definition.106 This change does not 
alter the outcomes for Sweden or Norway.107 However, it is significant for Finland since it results in the 
inclusion of a single NUTS 2 region, while the component NUTS 3 areas do not all meet the 12.5 
inhabitants per km2 threshold (so coverage is higher than it would be if coverage were based on the 
NUTS 3 criterion alone).108 
Table 9: Assisted area coverage 2014-20 
 µD¶UHJLRQV µF¶DUHDV Of which, 
ex-µD¶ 
Sparsely-
popd 
Non-
SUHGHIGµF¶ Total 
EU28 25.82 21.85 6.74 0.58 14.53 47.67 
EU27 25.17 22.04 6.80 0.58 14.66 47.21 
BE 0.00 29.95 12.06  17.89 29.95 
BG 100.00  
   
100.00 
CZ 88.10  
   
88.10 
DK 
 
7.97 
  
7.97 7.97 
DE 
 
25.85 11.9 
 
13.95 25.85 
EE 100.00  
   
100.00 
IE 
 
51.28 
  
51.28 51.28 
EL 45.91 54.09 10.08 0.17 43.84 100.00 
ES 6.90 61.76 28.25 0.51 33.00 68.66 
FR 2.93 21.24 
  
21.24 24.17 
IT 29.04 5.03 
  
5.03 34.07 
CY 
 
50.00 
  
50.00 50.00 
LV 100.00  
   
100.00 
LT 100.00  
   
100.00 
LU 
 
8.00 
  
8 8.00 
HU 70.38 6.33 
  
6.33 76.71 
MT 
 
100.00 100 
  
100.00 
NL 
 
7.50 
  
7.5 7.50 
AT 
 
25.87 
  
25.87 25.87 
PL 86.30 13.70 13.7 
  
100.00 
PT 69.25 15.77 
  
15.77 85.02 
RO 89.44 10.56 10.56 
  
100.00 
SI 52.92 47.08 47.08 
  
100.00 
SK 88.48  
   
88.48 
FI 
 
26.10 
 
24.25 1.85 26.10 
SE 
 
12.26 
 
12.26 
 
12.26 
UK 3.91 23.14 
 
0.35 22.79 27.05 
HR 100.00  
   
100.00 
 
  
    
IS 
  
 36.5  36.5 
NO 
  
 25.51  25.51 
Note: As mentioned below, the change in definition of sparsely-populated regions could, apparently, result in 
Iceland being designated in its entirety; the lower figure corresponds to the definition based on NUTS 3, as now. 
Source: RAG 2014-20, Annex I and ESA RAG 2014-20, para 142 for Iceland and Norway. 
                                                     
105
 Based on Eurostat population density data for 2010. 
106
 RAG 2007-13, para 26, footnote 29 and para 30(b). 
107
 Coverage in Norway is reduced but this is because of higher population density in Aust Agder county, not 
because of the change in definition.  
108
 In principle, it could also have resulted in the inclusion of Iceland in its entirety since Iceland constitutes a 
single NUTS 2 region, with population density of 3.2 per km2; however, ESA did not apply this principle but 
retained the approach used in the ESA RAG 2007-13.  
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As previously, the population of non-SUHGHILQHG µF¶ DUHDV was FDOFXODWHG E\ VXEWUDFWLQJ WKH µD¶
UHJLRQVDQG WKHSUHGHILQHG µF¶DUHDV IURPWKH LQLWLDOFHLOLQJ7KHSRSXODWLRQ was distributed between 
countries on the basis of both national and EU disparities in GDP per head and unemployment 
rates.109 There were significant detailed changes to the methodology for the distribution of the 
population compared to RAG 2007-2013 and 2000-6,110 which both followed the same approach and 
one which emphasised national disparities within an EU context. For some countries the new method 
had a significant impact, as reflected in Figure 2. 
A series of further adjustments was PDGH WR µF¶ DUHD FRYHUDJH resulting from the population 
distribution methodology: 
x A µVDIHW\ QHW¶ was applied so that no Member State lost more than 50 percent of existing 
coverage111 (as in RAG 2007-13); Cyprus and Luxembourg benefited from this 
x Each Member State was assigned minimum coverage of 7.5 percent of the population.112 This 
was a new provision compared to RAG 2007-13, but finds a precedent in RAG 2000-6 which 
set a floor of 15 percent of coverage. The Netherlands benefitted from this.  
x Special provisions were made for Member StDWHV VXEMHFW WR YDULRXV µEDLORXW¶ PHFKDQLVPV
such that those countries affected did not see a reduction in coverage.113 Greece, Cyprus (in 
a further adjustment) and Portugal benefitted from this.  
As discussed below, tKHDFWXDOVHOHFWLRQRIµF¶DUHDV is undertaken by domestic authorities, based on 
parameters set in RAG 2014-20;114 similar to the position in 2007-13. 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQZLOOUHYLHZFRYHUDJHRIWKH µD¶UHJLRQVLQWRHVWDEOLVKZKHWKHUWKHOLVWRIVXFK
regions should be extended (there is no implication that it would be reduced); this would entail 
FKDQJHVWRµF¶DUHDFRYHUDJHLQWKHFRXQWULHVFRQFHUQHG115 
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of RAG 2014-20 on spatial coverage. At the EU level, the most striking 
point to note is that, while overall coverage increases by around one percentage point, there is a 
pronounced shift in the composition of this coverage ± ZLWKµD¶ region coverage falling from around 33 
SHUFHQWWRVRPHSHUFHQWRIWKH(8SRSXODWLRQDQGµF¶DUHDVULVLQJIURPXQGHUSHUFHQWWRRYHU
22 percent. 
At country level, patterns of change vary widely. In relative WHUPVWKHELJJHVWµORVHU¶LV/X[HPERXUJ 
where coverage is halved. In absolute terms, the biggest loser is Hungary, which loses over 23 
percent of existing coverage (down from 100 percent to under 77 percent). Finland and Sweden each 
lose around 20 percent of current coverage. Germany sees a reduction of almost four percentage 
points, but also significant is that no German region has µD¶VWDWXV IURP-XO\ ,Q'HQPDUNDQG
Italy there are more modest reductions in coverage. 
                                                     
109
 RAG 2014-20, Annex II. 
110
 Guidelines on national regional aid [1998] OJ C74/9 (RAG 2000-6) 
111
 RAG 2014-20, para 165(b). 
112
 RAG 2014-20, para 165(c). 
113
 RAG 2014-20, para 163. 
114
 RAG 2014-20, para 167-170. 
115
 RAG 2014-20, para 183-185. 
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Some countries see no change in overall coverage: Bulgaria and the three Baltic states retain 100 
SHUFHQW µD¶ UHJLRQ FRYHUDJH DQG 0DOWD KDV  SHUFHQW FRYHUDJH EXW ZLWK µF¶ DUHD UDWKHU WKDQ µD¶
region status. Overall coverage is also unchanged in Poland, Romania and Slovenia but the capital 
UHJLRQVQRZKDYHµF¶DUHDUDWKHU WKDQµD¶UHJLRQVWDWXV,QWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFDQG6ORYDNLDFRYHUDJH
is essentially unchanged; the differences shown in  Figure 2 are the result of demographic change. 
*UHHFH DQG &\SUXV EHQHILW IURP WKH VSHFLDO SURYLVLRQV IRU FRXQWULHV LQ UHFHLSW RI µEDLO RXW¶
mechanisms and retain coverage at existing levels. Coverage remains unchanged in the Netherlands 
which relies on the minimum 7.5 percent coverage, (the same as previous coverage). Coverage of 
Croatia is not mentioned in RAG 2014-20 but, on the basis of the relevant GDP data, qualifies as an 
µD¶UHJLRQLQLWVHQWLUHW\ 
$WWKHRSSRVLWHHQGRI WKHVSHFWUXPWKHELJJHVW µZLQQHU¶ LQ relative terms is France, which sees an 
increase in existing coverage of over 30 percent. In absolute terms, the main gains are in Portugal 
and Spain ± where coverage increases by 8.3 and 9 percentage points respectively. Austria, Belgium 
and the United Kingdom see coverage increase by around three to four percentage points, and there 
are more modest gains in Ireland. 
Though it is striking that some of the more prosperous Member States see an increase in coverage, it 
should also be recalled that RAG 2014-LVPXFKPRUHUHVWULFWLYHLQLWVWUHDWPHQWRIODUJHILUPVLQµF¶
DUHDVWKDQLQµD¶UHJLRQV$VVXFKWKHµF¶DUHDPDSVLQSUDctice, serve mainly to determine eligibility 
for greenfield and diversification investments by large firms DQGWKRVHDUHDVLQZKLFKWKH60(µERQXV¶
applies. 
 
  
Figure 2: Population coverage 2007-13 and 2014-20 (% of total) 
 
Note: 2007-13 figures in fact relate to 2011-13, i.e. following the 2010 review when Statistical effect areas were re-GHVLJQDWHGDVµIXOO¶µD¶UHJLRQVRUµF¶DUHDV 
Source: RAG 2007-13, RAG 2014-20 and own calculations from Eurostat data, 
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3.2 The selection of eligible areas 
Under RAG 2014-20, as under RAG 2007- µD¶ UHJLon coverage is predetermined by the 
Commission. An important change under RAG 2014-20 is that the population allocation determined 
E\ WKHSUHGHILQHGDUHDV IRUPHU µD¶DUHDVEURDGO\DQDORJRXV WR WKHHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWDUHDV LQ
RAG 2007-13) may only be used to designate those areas.116 In 2007-13 some countries (for example 
the United Kingdom and Italy) used this population to designate areas other than in the qualifying 
regions; this is not possible under RAG 2014-20. 117 
There is slightly more flexibility in the designation of sparsely-populated areas (as was the case under 
RAG 2007-13). Whilst in principle these should concern NUTS 2 regions with fewer than 8 inhabitants 
per km2118 or NUTS 3 areas with fewer than 12.5 inhabitants per km2, parts of adjacent NUTS 3 areas 
may also be designated, provided that those parts also have population density below the 12.5 
inhabitant per km2 threshold. 
Proposals for the designation of the non-predefined areas are the responsibility of domestic 
authorities, subject to the parameters set out in RAG 2014-20119 and Commission approval of the 
resulting map. The parameters set by the Commission concern both designation criteria and 
geographical units of analysis ± µEXLOGLQJEORFNV¶ 
3.2.1 Area designation criteria for investment aid (non-SUHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDV 
The key designation criteria are set out in Table 10. At first sight this appears as a rather complex 
matrix of options. In practice, however, the criteria are similar to those for RAG 2007-13: in general, 
areas must have GDP(PPS) below the EU average or an unemployment rate 15 percent higher than 
the national average. The key differences between RAG 2014-20 and its predecessor are that there is 
now greater flexibility on minimum population coverage for countries with relatively low coverage and 
WKDWWKHµVWUXFWXUDOFKDQJH¶FULWHULRQZKLFKUHTXLUHVDPLQLPXPSRSXODWLRQRIFDQQRWEHXVHG
to designate areas that could qualify under Criterion 1, or Criterion 2. Also, the capacity to target very 
localised problems for areas with a minimum coverage of 20,000 through support for SMEs has been 
dropped. While the minimum population criteria show more flexibility, at least for some countries, as 
will be seen below, the building block requirements introduce new constraints. 
                                                     
116
 RAG 2014-20, para 159. 
117
 Though Member States could opt not to include all the predefined areas in the proposed map; the 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJSRSXODWLRQTXRWDZRXOGKRZHYHUEHµORVW¶ 
118
 As noted earlier, the reference to NUTS 2 areas as the basis for predefined sparsely-populated areas is new, 
but the flexibility to designate parts of NUTS 3 areas is not. 
119
 RAG 2014-20, para 168-70. 
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Table 10: Key area designation criteria for non-SUHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDV 
Criterion Conditions Minimum population 
1. Contiguous areas 
Within NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 regions with 
either: 
x *'3336SHUKHDG(8RU 
x 8QHPSOR\PHQWUDWHRI
national average 
x General case: 100,000 
x For 06ZLWKµF¶FRYHUDJHޒPLOOLRQ
50,000 
x For MS with national pop 
ޒ1million: 10,000 
2. NUTS 3 regions with 
pop < 100,000 
x *'3336SHUKHDG(8RU 
x 8QHPSOR\PHQWUDWHRI
national average 
Not applicable 
3. Islands and other 
contiguous areas 
characterised by 
geographical isolation 
x *'3336SHUKHDG(8RU 
x 8QHPSOR\PHQWUDWHRI
national average or 
x <5000 population 
None 
4. Border areas  
x Contiguous areas 
x NUTS 3 or parts of 
x $GMDFHQWWRµD¶UHJLRQRU 
x Land border with non-EEA 
country 
None 
5. Structural change or 
serious decline 
x Must not be within areas that fulfil 
criteria 1-4 above 
x Contiguous areas 
x General case: 50,000 
x )RU06ZLWKµF¶FRYHUDJHޒPLOOLRQ
25,000 
x For MS with national pop 
ޒ1million: 10,000 
x Isolated areas (cf criterion 3): 
5,000  
Source: Summarised from RAG 2014-20, para 168.  
The national populations and the coverage of non-SUHGHILQHG µF DUHDV DUH JLYHQ LQ Table 11. This 
suggests that only Cyprus and Luxembourg qualify for the 10,000 population minimum under Criteria 
1 and 5; and that Denmark, Hungary, Portugal and Finland qualify for the 50,000 and 25,000 
population minima under Criteria 1 and 5 respectively. 
Table 11: Non-SUHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDVDQGQDWLRQDOSRSXODWLRQ 
 
1RQSUHGHILQHGµF¶SRSXODWLRQµV National population (000s) 
DK 460 5546 
DE 11774 81766 
IE 2386 4475 
EL 4959 11312 
ES 14670 46074 
FR 14086 64823 
IT 2873 60477 
CY 415 831 
LU 41 508 
HU 658 9994 
NL 1245 16603 
AT 2258 8392 
PT 793 10639 
FI 103 5362 
UK 14027 62257 
Source: Eurostat and EPRC calculations from RAG 2014-20. 
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3.2.2 Building blocks for investment aid (non-SUHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDV 
The geographic unit of analysis ± or building block - is specified as local administrative unit 2 (LAU2) 
± see Table 12.120 
Table 12: Geographical units ± EU definitions 
 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 LAU 1 LAU 2 
BE Provincies / 
Provinces 
11  Arrondissementen / 
Arrondissements 
44  -   Gemeenten 
/ 
Communes 
589  
DK Regioner 5  Landsdeler 11  Kommuner 99  Sogne 2143  
DE Regierungs-
bezirke 
38  Kreise 412  Verwaltungsge- 
meinschaften 
1481 Gemeinden 12066  
IE Regions 2  Regional Authority 
Regions 
8  Counties, Cities 34  Electoral 
Districts 
3441  
ES Comunidades y 
ciudades 
Autonomas 
19  Provincias + islas 
+ Ceuta, Melilla 
59  -   Municipios 8116  
FR Régions + DOM 26  Départements + 
DOM 
100  Cantons de 
rattachement 
3785 Communes 36680 
IT Regioni 21  Provincie 110 -   Comuni 8094  
CY - 1  - 1  ǼʌĮȡȤȓİȢ
(Eparchies) 
6  Dimoi, 
koinotites 
615  
LU - 1  - 1  Cantons 13  Communes 116  
HU Tervezési-
statisztikai 
régiók 
7  Megyék +  
Budapest 
20  Statisztikai 
kistérségek 
174  Települések 3154  
NL Provincies 12  &2523UHJLR¶V 40  -   Gemeenten 418  
AT Bundesländer 9  Gruppen von 
politischen Bezirken 
35  -   Gemeinden 2357  
PT Comissaoes de 
Coordenaçao 
regional + 
Regioes auto. 
7  Grupos de Con- 
celhos 
30  Concelhos - 
Munícipios 
308  Freguesias 4260  
FI Suuralueet / 
Storområden 
5  Maakunnat / 
Landskap 
19  Seutukunnat 
/ Ekonomiska 
regioner 
70  Kunnat / 
Kommuner 
336  
SE Riksområden 8  Län 21 -   Kommuner 290  
UK Counties (some 
grouped); Inner 
and Outer 
London; Groups 
of unitary 
authorities 
37  Upper tier authorities 
or groups of lower 
tier authorities 
(unitary authorities 
or districts) 
139 Lower tier auths 
individual unitary 
auths; Individual 
unitary auths or 
LECs (or parts); 
Districts 
380 Wards (or 
parts 
thereof) 
10310  
Source: Eurostat 
$QLPSRUWDQWLVVXHLVWKHQRWLRQRIµFRQWLJXLW\¶ZKLFKLVDQH[SOLFLWUHTXLUHPHQWRI&ULWHULDDQG-5, 
and implicit in Criterion 2. The notion of contiguous areas refers to whole LAU2 areas or to a group of 
whole LAU2 areas. A group of LAU2 areas is considered to be contiguous if each of those areas in 
the group shares an administrative border with another area in the group. However, parts of LAU2 
may be designated, provided that the population is at least 50 percent of the minimum population 
required under the criterion applicable. Under Criterion 1, for example, in the general case, this 
appears designed to preclude the inclusion of an area comprising a population of 150,000 of which 
120,000 in one LAU2 and the remaining 30,000 in parts of adjoining LAU2. In contrast with the 
provisions on population minima outlined in Table 12 WKLV µDQWL OHRSDUG VNLQ¶ FODXVH UHSUHVHQWV D
significant tightening of existing provisions. For 2007-13 a number of countries designated areas on 
                                                     
120
 RAG 2014-20, para 169. 
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the basis of units below LAU2, and while these maps were accepted, it is also known that such 
DSSURDFKHVZHUHQRWDOZD\VFRQVLGHUHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQWREHµZLWKLQWKHVSLULW¶RI5$*-13. 
3.2.3 Assisted areas for operating aid 
It is important to note that the above discussion relates to area designation for investment aid, which 
accounts for most schemes. RAG 2014-20 also allows for the possibility of operating aid being 
compatible:  
«´LILWDLPVWRUHGXFHFHUWDLQVSHFLILFGLIILFXOWLHVIDFHGE\60(VLQSDUWLFXODUO\GLVDGYDQWDJHG
areas falling within the scope of Article 107(3)(a) of the Treaty, or to compensate for 
additional costs to pursue an economic activity in an outermost region or to prevent or reduce 
GHSRSXODWLRQLQYHU\VSDUVHO\SRSXODWHGDUHDV´121 
Apart from the Outermost regions, which are defined in the TFEU, the targeting of operating aid 
schemes is determined on the basis of separate maps from that for investment aid and is not linked to 
the population ceilings. RAG 2014- PDNHV VSHFLILF UHIHUHQFH WR WKH HOLJLELOLW\ RI µYHU\ VSDUVHO\
SRSXODWHG¶UHJLRQVIRURSHUDWLQJDLG7KHVHDUHGHILQHGDV 
³1876  UHJLRQV ZLWK OHVV WKDQ  LQKDELWDQWV SHU NP2 or parts of such NUTS 2 regions 
designated by the Member States concerned in accordance with paragraph 162 of these 
JXLGHOLQHV´122 
The basic definition is unchanged from RAG 2007-13.123 However, there would appear to be a 
typographical error regarding flexibility in this provision since paragraph 162 is not really relevant to 
the coverage of sparsely-populated areas. It may be that the reference is intended to be to paragraph 
161, which would have entailed a material change to the definition of very sparsely populated areas 
that was not been signalled elsewhere in the reform discussions. On the other hand, all indications 
are that no change was intended. This is reflected in the approval of the Norwegian assisted areas 
maps for the social security discussed above.  
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 RAG 2014-20, para 16. 
122
 RAG 2014-20, para 20(y). 
123
 RAG 2007-13, para 80. 
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4. AREA DESIGNATION 
After the adoption of RAG 2014-20, regional aid control moved into a new phase, focused, in the first 
instance, on the development of assisted area maps; these determine the eligible areas and 
associated intensities for GBER-based measures, as well as investment aid schemes and individual 
and ad hoc awards that fall outside the GBER and have to be assessed on the basis of the RAG 
itself. Maps for operating aid schemes are not subject to a population ceiling; the scope of eligible 
areas for operating aid in sparsely-populated regions is defined on a case-by-case basis while for 
OMRs eligibility is determined by Treaty status. 
For a number of Member States, devising an assisted areas map is little more than a formality. If the 
entire country is eligible for regional aid (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Greece, Poland, 
6ORYHQLD5RPDQLD0DOWDRULIWKHHOLJLEOHSRSXODWLRQLVHQWLUHO\FRPSRVHGRIµD¶UHJLRQVWKH&]HFK
and Slovak Republics), there is no significant scope for domestic discretion beyond proposing aid 
intensities; the maximum rates are anyway determined by RAG 2014-20.  
In contrast, for many countries ± those where non-SUHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDs predominate - the process of 
selecting those areas can be a complex process involving the reconciliation of competing domestic 
demands with the constraints of RAG 2014-20. 
For all countries, the notification of a regional aid map is an essential prerequisite for providing 
investment aid to large firms, or taking advantage of the SME aid intensities under the GBER, 
whether support is offered on the basis of an aid scheme or is ad hoc; importantly, the approved 
maps form an integral part of RAG 2014-20,124 as under RAG 2007-13. By mid-September 2014 the 
Commission or the EFTA Surveillance Authority, as appropriate, had approved the maps of all 28 EU 
Member States, Norway and Iceland.  
The timescale of the approval process is illustrated in Table 13. The duration given here should be 
treated with caution ± it may be misleading as there may have been informal discussions prior to 
formal notification which speed up the process. Also, the Commission tends to approve maps in 
batches so that formal approval may be delayed, even though agreement has already been reached. 
Nevertheless, it is notable how quickly the maps have been approved. For example, almost all the 
2000-6 maps took longer to approve than any of the maps in this round; the 2000-6 maps took 
between five and 16 months to approve, with the formal investigative procedure being opened for four 
out of six maps. The 2007-13 maps took considerably less time, reflecting the relaxation of some of 
the area designation criteria, but some took up to a year to agree. 
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Table 13: Map submission and approval 
  Notification Approval Duration Case number 
Iceland 04 April 2014 24 April 2014 20 75228 
Norway (Investment aid) 31 January 2014 26 February 2014 26 75008 
Estonia 15 April 2014 21 May 2014 36 SA.38621 
Latvia 25 February 2014 09 April 2014 43 SA.38385 
Croatia 28 April 2014 11 June 2014 44 SA.38668 
Romania 20 February 2014 09 April 2014 48 SA.38364 
Finland 20 February 2014 09 April 2014 48 SA.38359 
Malta 14 March 2014 07 May 2014 54 SA.38468 
Ireland 26 March 2014 21 May 2014 56 SA.38509 
Cyprus 28 May 2014 23 July 2014 56 SA.38814 
Lithuania 26 March 2014 21 May 2014 56 SA.38510 
Greece 11 March 2014 07 May 2014 57 SA.38450 
Bulgaria 28 April 2014 25 June 2014 58 SA.38667 
Luxembourg 14 April 2014 11 June 2014 58 SA.38615 
Netherlands 18 July 2014 16 September 2014 60 SA.39108 
Spain 17 March 2014 21 May 2014 65 SA.38472 
Portugal 07 April 2014 11 June 2014 65 SA.38571 
Slovenia 20 December 2013 11 March 2014 81 SA.38060 
Italy 19 June 2014 16 September 2014 89 SA.38930 
Norway (Social security) 13 March 2014 18 June 2014 97 75581 
Sweden 18 December 2013 27 March 2014 99 SA.37985 
Denmark 27 January 2014 07 May 2014 100 SA.38247 
France 16 January 2014 07 May 2014 111 SA.38182 
Slovakia 03 October 2013 22 January 2014 111 SA.37447 
Hungary 13 November 2013 11 March 2014 118 SA.37718 
Poland 11 October 2013 20 February 2014 132 SA.37485 
Czech Republic 23 September 2013 04 February 2014 134 SA.37553 
United Kingdom 06 January 2014 21 May 2014 135 SA.38113 
Belgium 09 April 2014 16 September 2014 160 SA.38577 
Germany 30 September 2013 11 March 2014 162 SA.37423 
Austria 26 November 2013 21 May 2014 176 SA.37825 
Source: Compiled from Commission and ESA decisions. 
4.1 Arrangements for area designation 
Historically, countries have differed widely in their approaches to designating assisted areas, 
reflecting institutional structures and responsibilities, administrative conventions relating to 
consultation on certain issues and the perceived sensitivity of the process.  
Austria, France and Italy adopted a similar approach to areas designation insofar as WKH µF¶ DUHD
population quota was divided ex ante between the regions and the task of selecting the eligible areas 
delegated to that level.  
However, in France the process was essentially deconcentrated rather than devolved. At the national 
level the lead was taken by DATAR (as it then was) which allocated the population quotas as outlined 
below and drafted the circulaires to the Préfets, the government representative in the region, 
indicating how the designation process was to be managed. The main responsibility for designation 
lay with the Préfets, who were charged with consulting with Regional Councils and local partners. This 
is the same process as was used in 2007-13, but more emphasis was placed on consultation at the 
subnational level in 2014-20 than previously. In a first stage, 98 percent of the available population 
quota was shared between the regions (the rest being retained to enable any unforeseen issues to be 
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dealt with, as well as a small reserve). Of this, 75 percent was shared between the regions with 
Transition status under Cohesion policy on the basis of three criteria: 
x unemployment rate 
x household income 
x proportion of young people not in education, employment or training 
The remaining 25 percent was shared between regions without Transition status on the basis of: 
x unemployment rate 
x sectoral criteria ± notably the dominance of a particular industry in decline 
x share of innovative firms (a positive criterion) 
Following the decision on the population distribution maps were devised by the préfets then 
µDJJUHJDWHGXS¶LQWRDQDWLRQDOPDSEy DATAR. 
In Austria the population quota was divided between the Länder. The Land governments then had the 
main responsibility for defining the eligible areas, though ÖROK administers a common database of 
indicators to which the Länder have access.  
In Italy WKHGHVLJQDWLRQRI WKH µF¶DUHDVIRU-13 had been complex and controversial, leading to 
the Italian map being one of the last to be approved. The reasons for this were that constitutional 
reforms had devolved economic development responsibilities to the regions; as a result, the emphasis 
was on reaching agreement between the regions. This was extremely difficult, largely owing to the 
YHU\VPDOOµF¶DUHDSRSXOation quota accorded to Italy ± just 3.9 percent of the national population, of 
which most (2.9 percent) was accounted for by Sardegna which, as an economic development area, 
had an a priori FODLPRQµF¶VWDWXV 
For 2014-DVEHIRUH WKHSURFHVV LQYROYHGDPL[RI µWHFKQRFUDWLF¶DQGSROLWLFDOGLVFXVVLRQVZLWKLQ
the CINSEDO (the Conference of Regions and Autonomous Provinces), within the working group 
chaired by the Ministry for Territorial Cohesion, which also led and oversaw the negotiations of RAG 
2014-20. The first stage of the process was to reach political agreement on the method to divide the 
population between the regions. The result of this process was that, in the first instance, 10 percent of 
the quota was set aside for areas eligible on the basis of Criterion 5 only. The remaining 90 percent of 
non-SUHGHILQHGµF¶SRSXODWLRQZDVGLYLGed between the regions as follows: 
x 50 percent on the basis of the share of eligible population in the total population of each 
province 
x 50 percent on the basis of how many of the five criteria were fulfilled by each province 
On the basis of the population quotas calculated, each region put forward its own map proposals 
based on the criteria in RAG 2014-20. The Department for Development and Economic Cohesion 
then aggregated up the regional proposals, along with the justifications for the use of Criterion 5, for 
notification to the Commission.  
In Germany, as in previous periods, area designation was led by the Federal Ministry of Economy 
and Technology which coordinated proposals and secured domestic agreement. The main domestic 
forums where the proposals were discussed weUH WKH *5: µ5HJLRQDO -RLQW 7DVN¶ &RRUGLQDWLRQ
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Committee at political level, and the GRW Sub-Committee at technical level. Overall the process was 
largely technocratic but the most sensitive decisions were taken at a political level. In both cases, the 
process was lengthy and involved extensive discussions, negotiations and trade-offs between the 
federal authorities and representatives of all the Länder. Technical decisions are made by the GRW 
Sub-Committee which is composed of federal and Land civil servants and chaired by a senior civil 
servant from the Federal Ministry for the Economy and Technology. Political decisions are either 
taken by the GRW Coordination Committee (made up of federal and Land Economics Ministers, and 
chaired by the Federal Minister for the Economy and Technology) or by the domestic Group of 
Ministers for the Economy (Wirtschaftsministerkonferenz) ± which is made up of the relevant ministers 
of each Land and the relevant federal minister ± sometimes separated into ministers for the eastern 
and western Länder respectively. In practice, preparations for the 2014-20 assisted areas map had 
been underway well before the adoption of RAG 2014-20, which determined the final population 
coverage available. Domestic preparations and the pre-H[LVWHQFH RI µZHOO-RLOHG¶ PDFKLQHU\ IRU DUHD
designation enabled the German authorities to adopt an assisted area map and notify it to the 
Commission by end September 2013.  
In the United Kingdom, as in the past, an extensive public consultation process took place.125 The 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), acting on behalf of the UK Government, 
coordinated the consultation exercise with the devolved administrations for Scotland and Wales and 
submitted the UK 2014-20 assisted areas map to the Commission for approval. Northern Ireland was 
not included in this process and it was agreed at the outset that Northern Ireland would retain 100 
SHUFHQWDVVLVWHGDUHDVWDWXV µIRUDW OHDVW WKHPHGLXPWHUP¶126 The first stage consultation document 
outlined the requirements of RAG 2014-20 and sought responses on two issues: a set of proposed 
µFRPPRQSULQFLSOHV¶IRUGUDZLng up the 2014-20 assisted areas map; and so-FDOOHGµORFDOLQWHOOLJHQFH¶
that could be considered alongside economic data and policy considerations. The main targets of the 
process were: the Local Enterprise Partnerships in England; and local authorities in England, 
Scotland and Wales, all of whom were alerted to the consultation. These bodies were encouraged to 
collaborate to identify cross boundary issues. In addition, the consultation document was sent to a 
number of national stakeholders (eg. business organisations and planning associations), but was also 
open to the general public. The first stage closed on 30 September 2013. The second stage 
document, comprising the draft assisted areas map was put out to consultation in December 2013, 
and closed for comments in early February 2014.127 The Welsh and Scottish governments had an 
important role to play in the gathering of local intelligence, coordinating the development of the draft 
maps presented at Stage 2 and refining the map in the light of the second round of consultation. 
However, the Stage 1 consultation document had not indicated whether this would be done on the 
basis of devolved population ceilings, similar to the process in France, Italy and Austria. In practice, 
however, the maps for England, Scotland and Wales were developed separately within population 
quotas based on coverage in 2007-13 ± in other words, the previous shares of coverage in England, 
Scotland and Wales were maintained.  
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 Department for Business Innovation & Skills (2013) 2014-20 Assisted Areas Map: Consultation stage 1: 
Common Principles and Local Intelligence. 
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 HM government and Northern Ireland Executive (2013) Building a Prosperous and United Community 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/206979/Building_a_Prosperous_a
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 Department for Business Innovation & Skills (2013) 2014-20 Assisted Areas Map: Consultation stage 2: draft 
assisted areas map and government response to Stage 1, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267159/bis-13-962-2014-to-2020-
assisted-areas-map-consultation-stage-2-draft-assisted-areas-map-and-government-response-to-stage-1.pdf  
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The area designation process was far more centralised in the remaining EoRPA partner countries. In 
Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands, area designation is largely undertaken as a 
technocratic exercise within the ministries responsible for regional policy, though this is not to say that 
there is no external consultation or political input, but the mechanisms for this are less formal and the 
role of external input is lower key.  
In the Netherlands there is no longer a regional aid scheme at the national level (the IPR was 
abolished in 2011), which diminishes the importance of an assisted areas map in general, though it 
can still be used as the basis for policies operated at the subnational level. Drafting the map is the 
responsibility for the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MEZ) and is mainly a technocratic exercise, though 
the provinces were consulted about the proposed map.128 The overall aim had been to focus on the 
same areas as in 2007-13; in the event, however, the province of Limburg had ceased to meet the 
criteria, delaying the submission of the map.  
In Finland, Sweden and Norway the initial task of drawing up the map falls to policymakers in the 
relevant ministries, following which it is subject to political discussions. In Norway, for example, where 
the 2014-20 map was long under discussion internally, policymakers drew up three alternative 
scenarios for each map (the investment aid map and the map of very sparsely populated areas where 
the social security concession applies). The different options used different indicators and weightings, 
but ultimately the choice was a political one. Importantly, all three countries rely exclusively (Norway 
and Sweden) or almost exclusively (Finland) on the predefined sparsely populated areas for 
coverage. The new provisions on the non-transferability of this population to areas not meeting the 
population density criterion were an important constraint notably in Sweden.  
In Poland, area designation per se LVQRWUHTXLUHGDVWKHZKROHFRXQWU\UHPDLQVHOLJLEOHHLWKHUDVµD¶
UHJLRQVRUSUHGHILQHGµF¶DUHDV1HYHUWKHOHVVDVQRWHGDPDShad to be formally submitted, though 
the parameters for this were effectively determined by RAG 2014-20, largely eliminating domestic 
discretion. 
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Figure 3: Assisted Areas in Poland 2014-20 
 
4.2 Approaches to assisted area maps 
Member States adopt diverse area designation strategies to reconcile Commission constraints with 
domestic considerations. These considerations comprise a mix of policy options such as indigenous 
or inward investment, areas of need or opportunity ± and political issues, such as the perceived 
equitable distribution of assisted areas between regions and the sensitivity of de-designating some 
areas, while according assisted area status to others for the first time. In the past, and rather more 
prosaically, an important factor was often the ease with which the map could be approved by the 
Commission, sometimes leading to rather pragmatic, as opposed to strictly policy-oriented, 
approaches to area designation. 
In Austria and Italy the national assisted areas maps are essentially the sum of regional choices 
since, on the basis of the population quota, proposals are the prerogative of the regional level, subject 
to the constraints of the RAG. In Italy, the principal focus of regional policy is on the south, the 
Mezzogiorno. Coverage of WKHµF¶DUHDVLVPRGHVWDWDURXQGSHUFHQWRIWKHQDWLRQDOSRSXODWLRQ7KLV
small quota, coupled with the need to reconcile regional priorities with the constraints on building 
blocks is the driver of outcomes rather than an overarching national strategic approach.  
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Figure 4: Assisted Areas in Austria 2014-20 
Source: ÖROK, http://www.oerok.gv.at/eu-regionalpolitik/regionales-eu-beihilfenrecht/periode-2014-2020.html 
(accessed 17 July 2014). 
Austria KDV D PRUH JHQHURXV µF¶ SRSXODWLRQ TXRWD WKDQ ,WDO\ DQG KLJKHU WKDQ LQ 07-13), but 
reflecting the federal structure and arrangements for area designation, outcomes echo Land level 
priorities coupled with political negotiations, rather than a national approach per se. Nevertheless, the 
national dimension is important in the context of the provision of common data and the political 
negotiations needed to achieve consensus, and there are some specific concerns relating to the 
definition and inclusion of mountain areas that were addressed by national authorities with the 
Commission.  
In France, a more explicit policy steer was given by DATAR which outlines two objectives in the 
instructions to the Préfets. First, that the map should contribute to the attraction of mobile investment, 
typically by large firms; and second that it should support the development of SMEs through the 
higher aid intensities applicable in the designated areas. However, given the extent to which the 
drafting of the map was decentralised, it is difficult to discern how these objectives were taken into 
account on the ground. 
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Figure 5: Assisted Areas in France 2014-20 
 
In Germany the philosophy underpinning the map is based on national perceptions of economic 
disadvantage, but with some political adjustments a) to ensure that agreement can be reached among 
all Länder DQG WKH IHGHUDO OHYHO DQG E WR PDLQWDLQ µEX\-LQ¶ WR WKH *5: IURP DV PDQ\ Länder as 
possible (notably the western Länder). This rationale is unchanged compared to the past. The GRW 
Sub-Committee agreed the following principles for the regional aid map and process in 2014-20: 
x The goal of the GRW is to strengthen growth in structurally weak areas, to create permanent 
competitive jobs and to support regions undergoing structural change. 
x The GRW system benefits from ensuring that as wide as possible a number of Länder have 
designated areas. 
x Area designation is on the basis of objective, consistent and economic criteria. 
x GRW funding should be focused on structurally weak areas. 
x Area designation should be transparent and comprehensible. 
As in 2007-13, the map is based on 258 GRPHVWLF µODERXUPDUNHWDUHDV¶ Arbeitsmarktregionen). In 
many cases, these areas are identical to NUTS 3 regions; there are also, however, numerous 
exceptions, particularly in urban areas (because the labour market areas are akin to travel-to-work-
areas). Reflecting the principles outlined above, all German regions were ranked on the basis of a 
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composite indicator, made up of four sub-indicators, the first two of which are significantly more 
important in terms of weighting, namely:  
x the annual average unemployment rate in 2009-12 (45 percent weighting) 
x the annual gross wage per employee paying social insurance in 2010 (40 percent weighting) 
x the employment forecast for 2011-18 (7.5 percent weighting) 
x an infrastructure indicator at 30 September 2012 (7.5 percent weighting) 
 
Figure 6: Assisted Areas in Germany 2014 
 
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
In broad terms, these are the same indicators used for designating areas in 2007-13. In essence, 
areas are included in the map in order of the ranking until the population quota is exhausted, but 
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further adjustments were made to deal with specific issues. Moreover, in addition to designating areas 
covered by the EU regional aid map, the same methods and ranking are used for designating 
GRPHVWLFµ'¶DUHDVZKLFKDUHHOLJLEOHIRUVSHFLILFIXQGLQJIRU60(DLG7KH*HUPDQDSSURDFKFDQEH
regarded as one of continuity, albeit within the context of a significant reduction in assisted area 
coverage. 
In the United Kingdom the approach adopted for 2014-20 was PRUH µERWWRPXS¶DQG OHVVPHWULFV-
based than its predecessor. In particular, it sought to make more use of locally provided economic 
intelligence than in the past; for 2007-13, the basis for the map was essentially the previous map, 
partly reflecting the cutbacks in coverage which had to be absorbed. The consultation document set 
out a number of common principles on which it intended to draw in drafting the assisted areas map. 
These were cast in terms of assessing both economic opportunity and need.  
The consultation asked respondents for their views on these principles, as well as seeking a better 
understanding of the geography of local economic opportunity by tapping into local knowledge and 
taking account of local priorities. In preparing the draft map, the Government took account of: 
 responses to Stage 1 of the consultation; 
 national economic datasets; 
 commercial and economic intelligence; 
 Government strategy and policies e.g. the UK Industrial Policy and the location and 
nature of Enterprise Zones; 
 views of key national teams responsible for policies supported by regional aid; 
 regional economic plans and priorities were also considered in Scotland and Wales; 
 the metrics used in considering potential areas for inclusion on the map, which were: 
o employment rate excluding full time students - compared across Great Britain (2011 
census data); 
o skills levels (the proportion below Level 2); 
o working age benefit claimant count rate - compared across Great Britain (May 2013 
DWP data); 
o proportion of employment in manufacturing, taken from the 2012 Inter-Departmental 
Business Register. 
An area qualifying under RAG Criteria 1, 2, 3 or 5 was eligible for inclusion on the draft assisted areas 
map 2014-2020 if it met at least one of the following:  
1. More than one standard deviation away from the mean for at least one metric (in the direction 
that suggests inclusion); 
2. More than half a standard deviation away for at least two metrics (in the direction that 
suggests inclusion); or 
3. $ERYHDYHUDJHIRUDOOIRXUPHWULFVDJDLQµDERYH¶LVXVHGEXWWKLVLVWRPHDQLQWKHGLUHFWLRQ
supporting inclusion). 
However, meeting one of these criteria was not conclusive as to whether that an area would be added 
to the map; when making the selection, the Government sought wards that contained economic 
opportunities that could be unlocked by regional aid to support growth in less advantaged economies. 
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Figure 7: Assisted Areas in the United Kingdom 2014-20 
 
For the Netherlands there were three principal considerations in drafting the new map:129 continuity 
with the existing map (in principle 31 percent of the Dutch population falls within areas that meet the 
criteria, but the population ceiling is 7.5 percent); special support for Groningen in the context of a 
package of measures to address the negative effects of gas extraction in the region as well as 
structural changes resulting from major plant closures (eg the chemical firm Aldal); and specific 
concerns with areas along parts of the German and Belgian borders, particularly at the scale of cross-
border differences in household income and unemployment. Moreover, Germany is perceived to have 
generous regional aid instruments that could potentially disadvantage Dutch firms. The capacity to 
address this last point was constrained by the fact that Limburg, parts of which have long been 
included in the Dutch assisted areas map, did not meet the GDP or unemployment criteria in the 
RAG. However, it underpinned the designation of Achterhoek, on the German border, and Groot-
Rijnmond (close to Rotterdam), which although not on the Belgian border, provides the scope for 
investment opportunities linked to port and waterway infrastructure and potentially the development of 
a cluster of activity associated with the chemical industry and the reduction of emissions. 
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In Finland and Sweden approaches to area designation were more tightly constrained than before 
RZLQJWRWKHµQRQ-WUDQVIHUDELOLW\¶RIWKHSRSXODWLRQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKSUH-defined areas. In 2007-13 both 
Sweden and Finland had used the possibility of deploying this population elsewhere in order to 
address national priorities outside the strict limits of the sparsely-populated areas ± although the 
sparsely-populated areas remained the main focus of policy, not least because they qualified on a 
number of other indicators of disadvantage.  
Figure 8: Assisted Areas in Sweden 2014-20 
 
For the 2014-20 map Sweden could only designate areas that fulfil the sparsely-populated region 
criterion, a constraint that is somewhat at odds with recent regional economic developments in 
Sweden where the north has been performing comparatively well, largely due shifts in certain 
commodity markets, while there are pockets of difficulty in southern Sweden owing to the wider 
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economic downturn. Nevertheless, there is some flexibility in the RAG over the precise coverage of 
the areas. This was used to exclude some population centres (in Luleå, Umeå, Sundsvall, Falun and 
Borlänge) from the map in order to include areas adjacent to the NUTS 3 pre-defined regions which 
met the sparse population criterion.  
Finland had somewhat more flexibility, since a small non-predefined population quota (1.85 percent of 
the population) was also allocated; however, this is significantly less than the 9.3 percent available in 
2007-13.  
Figure 9: Assisted Areas in Finland 2014-20 
 
The ministerial working group on public administration and regional development undertook and 
assessment of the areas facing sudden structural changes. This was done on the basis of 
unemployment rates and trends. In addition, GDP per capita, which tends to fluctuate strongly, was 
taken into consideration. However, statistical analyses were only one component of the assessment, 
with the limited population quota the major consideration.130 Salo was selected because of the 
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ongoing impact of the restructuring of Nokia. This has resulted in the highest number of job losses 
seen in Finland, but designation of the area was also viewed as a means of encouraging new 
investment, given the presence of a highly-skilled workforce. Salo accounts for 1.181 percent of the 
WRWDO SRSXODWLRQ OHDYLQJ D µUHVHUYH¶ RI  inhabitants (0.669 percent). The decision on the 
eligibility of possible other areas will be made at a later stage, but is expected to be focused on areas 
suffering from sudden structural changes. The aid areas will be reviewed as part of the mid-term 
evaluation of the Regional Aid map for 2017-20.131 The most significant change in the Finnish map 
concerns the former aid areas of Åland (Ålands landsbygd and Ålands skärgård). Over the period of 
2010-12, unemployment in these areas was lowest in the country and GDP per capita the second 
highest in the country. Their continued inclusion in the map was not therefore considered justified.  
In Norway the basis for area designation proposals was the peripherality index which takes account 
of a range of indicators grouped into geography, demography, economic development and living 
standards. The peripherality index was updated in 2013, the previous version dates from 2006. The 
criteria and weightings under the 2013 index are as follows: 
Table 141RUZHJLDQµGLVWULFWLQGH[¶LQGLFDWRUV 
Indicator Weighting (%) 
Centrality (based on a composite indicator produced by NIBR) 20 
Population 10 
Travel time to Oslo 10 
Population growth in last 10 years 20 
Percentage of population >age 67 5 
Percentage of women aged 20-39 5 
Residence-based workforce participation rates 10 
Employment growth in the last ten years 10 
Income per taxpayer aged over 17 10 
Source: Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet (2013) Distriktsindeksen 2013: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/KRD/Vedlegg/REGA/distriktsindeks2013/Distriktsindeksen_2013_metode_data
kilder_kvalitetssikring.pdf  
The approach under the new index is not substantially different from its predecessor. The key 
changes (apart from updating the data) are that the new index measures employment participation 
rate on a residence rather than a workplace basis and that employment growth is considered over ten 
years, rather than five, as previously. The index was used as the basis for both the investment aid 
and the social security concession maps, the latter being less extensive in scope. 
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Figure 10: Assisted Areas in Norway 2014-20 (Investment Aid) 
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5. STATE AID, REGIONAL POLICY AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
In the wake of the so-called Leipzig-Halle case the relationship between funding of infrastructure and 
the State aid rules is changing.132 Historically, public funding of general infrastructure was either 
FRQVLGHUHGWREHZLWKLQWKH µSXEOLFUHPLW¶RU LIQRQ-discriminatory access was granted to all potential 
users, was not considered to involve State aid.133 7KH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V UHDSSUDLVDO RI WKH position 
following Leipzig-Halle extends the reach of the State aid rules into different areas of infrastructure 
support and creates significant uncertainty. In particular, a precise definition of what transactions 
qualify as State aid remains elusive, while the development of rules on what types of infrastructure aid 
are compatible with the Treaty is far from complete.  
These changes have had particular resonance for regional policy in Germany where specific 
instruments aimed at supporting infrastructure in the weaker regions have long been a feature of the 
regional policy package, but have not hitherto, been regarded as State aid. However, the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V VWDQFH KDV ZLGH-ranging implications for economic development policies more 
generally (at national and subnational levels) as well as for European Structural and Investment 
Funds which must, of course, also be State aid compliant. 
5.1 What is a State aid? 
$FULWLFDO LVVXH LQPDWWHUVRI6WDWHDLGFRPSOLDQFH LV WKDWDFRQFUHWHGHILQLWLRQ UHPDLQVHOXVLYH ³WKH
European Court has not yet provided a consistent and comprehensive interpretation of the conditions 
IRU6WDWHDLG´134 
The notion of what constitutes a State aid is clearly fundamental to being able discipline it, but the 
Treaty presents domestic policymakers with a conundrum insofar as it contains no precise definition 
of what is subject to control. It has been argued that this was probably deliberate135 ± if Member 
States knew the exact scope of the notion of aid, they could easily devise measures which would not 
satisfy all of the requirements, and the absence of an exact definition allows the Commission and the 
Courts to interpret the notion in a wide and flexible way. It is plausible to believe that such a view 
prevailed when the Treaties were written, but it is questionable whether the authors of the Treaty 
envisaged the extensive scope of the definition which has emerged. The growing complexity of public-
private relations, together with the wider range of activities now open to competition could hardly have 
been foreseen either. Nevertheless, the definitional issue is crucial since it determines whether or not 
a given measure136 requires to be notified to the Commission. As a result, domestic policymakers 
must make some a priori assessment of whether a measure involves aid in order to decide what steps 
to take to ensure compliance.  
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In 2014 the Commission sought, for the first time, systematically to clarify the concept of State aid. 
This took the form of a draft notice137 which was subject to consultation; this closed on 31 March 
2014. For the most part the document is a compilation of existing case law ± since the ultimate arbiter 
is the European Court - EXWLWDOVRUHIHUVWRWKHµGHFLVLRQDOSUDFWLFH¶RIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ,WUHPDLQVWR
be seen whether the document is actually finalised ± there are questions over the status of the 
document and while some Member States responded positively to the consultation and attempts at 
clarification, this was not universal. 
Article 107(1) establishes a basic, though not unqualified, prohibition of State aid: 
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the common market. 
The process of deciding whether a measure is caught by Article 107(1) can usefully be broken down 
into two stages: 
x First, the State aid rules only apply where the beneficiaries are undertakings; an undertaking 
is an entity engaged in an economic activity. 
x Second, a measure only constitutes State aid if all WKHFULWHULDLQWKH6WDWHDLGµWHVW¶DUHPHW 
The key issue in the present context has been the concept of economic activity. 
5.2 Undertakings and economic activity 
In order to qualify as aid, the recipient of the advantage conferred must be an undertaking. The 
notion of undertaking is neutral as to ownership, legal status and financing. The term undertaking is 
not defined in EU law, but it is established that it may be public or private, voluntary, charitable or not-
for-profit, involve a group of organisations or a public-private partnership or a self-employed 
individual; the key is not the status of the organisation, but rather that it must be engaged in an 
economic activity in order for Article 107(1) to apply.  
Economic activity LVEURDGO\GHILQHG DV µDQ\DFWLYLW\ FRQVLVWLQJ LQ RIIHULQJJRRGVRU VHUYLFHVRQ D
JLYHQPDUNHW¶138 There LVQRGHILQLWLYHOLVWRIHFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHVEXWµQRQ-HFRQRPLF¶DFWLYLWLHVLQFOXGH
those related to State prerogatives and public safety such as passports, police, armed forces, air and 
maritime traffic control, as well as the organisation of public education and compulsory social security 
contributions.  
Historically, public funding of general infrastructure was not considered to involve State aid if non-
discriminatory access was granted to all potential users of the infrastructure. For a long time, public 
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IXQGLQJ RI SRUWV DQG DLUSRUWV ZDV FRQVLGHUHG WR IDOO ZLWKLQ WKH µSXEOLF UHPLW¶ UDWKHU WKDQ EHLQJ DQ
µHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\¶7KLVZDVUHIOHFWHGLQWKH$YLDWLRQDLGJXLGHOLQHVZKLFKVWDWHGWKDW139 
³7KHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI>sic] enlargement of infrastructure projects (such as airports, motorways, 
bridges, etc.) represents a general measure of economic policy which cannot be controlled by 
WKH&RPPLVVLRQXQGHUWKH7UHDW\UXOHVRQ6WDWHDLGV´ 
5.3 The evolution of EU rules on aid for infrastructure 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIµHFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHV¶FKDQJHGIROORZLQJWKH*HQHUDO&RXUW¶VUXOLQJ
in Aéroports de Paris.140 In this case the Court held that:  
³7KH SURYLVLRQ RI DLUSRUW IDFLOLWLHV WR DLUOLQHV DQG WKH YDULRXV VHUYLFH SURYLGHUV E\ D SXEOLF
corporation, in return for a fee at a rate freely fixed by the latter, and the management of 
those facilities are economic activities, and although those activities are carried out on 
publicly-owned property, they do not for that reason form part of the exercise of a task 
cRQIHUUHGE\SXEOLFODZ´>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@ 
The Aéroports de Paris case was not concerned with State aid, but the ruling nevertheless effectively 
invalidated the principle that had been set out in the 1994 Aviation aid guidelines quoted above ± that 
infrastructure projects could not be controlled by the State aid rules. As a result, the Commission 
began to consider the presence of State aid for operators of airport infrastructure (who may be public 
or private). This in turn was reflected in the 2005 Guidelines on the financing of airports,141 which 
stated that: 
³WKHSURYLVLRQRIDLUSRUW LQIUDVWUXFWXUH WRDQRSHUDWRU E\ D 0HPEHU6WDWH LQFOXGLQJ ORFDORU
UHJLRQDO DXWKRULWLHV QRW DFWLQJ DV D SULYDWH LQYHVWRU« RU WKH JUDQWLQJ RI SXEOLF VXEVLGLHV
intended to finance infrastructure can give that airport operator an economic advantage over 
its competitors and must therefore be notified and examined in the light of the rules on State 
DLG´ 
The European Court of Justice ruling in Leipzig-Halle142 builds on this logic and links the construction 
of infrastructure to its later exploitation: if the subsequent use of the infrastructure constitutes an 
economic activity, then the funding of the construction may entail State aid. Importantly, the 
Commission has made clear its view that:143 
³LW FDQQRW EH GHQLHG DQ\PRUH WKDW WKH ILQDQFLQJ RI any type of infrastructure (excluding 
infrastructure related to security, safety, etc.) that is later commercially exploited is State aid 
UHOHYDQW´>HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO@ 
This means that only infrastructure that is not commercially exploited and is built in the interest of the 
general public is excluded from the application of the State aid rules. Examples include public roads 
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(other than toll roads / roads operated by a concessionaire) or public parks and playgrounds. In 
addition, case law has confirmed that infrastructure related to national security, safety, air traffic 
control, meteorological services all fall within the public remit. Notwithstanding these exclusions, it is 
evident that there are few types of infrastructure funding that fall clearly outside the scope of the State 
aid rules, though the precise contours of the public remit have yet to emerge. 
5.4 The need for clarification  
Following the shift in its thinking in the aftermath of Leipzig-Halle, the Commission provided some 
LQLWLDO JXLGDQFH WR 0HPEHU 6WDWHV LQ WKH IRUP RI µDQDO\WLFDO JULGV¶144 These outline the key issues 
associated with (i) determining the presence of State aid and (ii) identifying the circumstances in 
ZKLFK DLG FDQ EH IRXQG WR EH FRPSDWLEOH $ µJHQHUDO¶ DQDO\WLFDO JULG LV FRPSOHPHQWHG E\ VHFWRU
specific grids concerning the following: airport infrastructures; broadband infrastructures; culture ± 
such as the construction of multipurpose arenas, museums, film studios, cinemas and renovation of 
historical monuments; port infrastructure; research development and innovation; and water services.  
For practical purposes, however, the guidance provided by the grids is rather limited and they anyway 
have no legal status ± WKH\ H[SOLFLWO\ ³GR QRW SUHMXGJH SRVVLEOH GHYHORSPHQWV LQ WKH HQIRUFHPHQW
SUDFWLFH´$W WKHVDPH WLPH LQVRPHRI WKe areas noted, specific guidelines already apply but have 
been subject to review (broadband, airports, for example). In addition, some aspects of support for 
infrastructure are implicated in horizontal measures including the RAG and the GBER, which extends 
the exemption to sports infrastructure, multipurpose venues and local infrastructures. Notwithstanding 
these various developments, some significant uncertainties remain. In particular, for a number of 
areas, it is unclear in what precise circumstances the funding of infrastructure has State aid 
implications: 145 
³t)he classification as an activity falling within the exercise of public powers or as an 
economic activity must be carried out separately for each activity engaged in by a given 
entity´ 
In addition, where a measure does involve State aid there is no overarching framework under which 
to determine the compatibility or otherwise of that aid; the coverage of existing sector or activity-
specific frameworks is only partial. Importantly, this matters not just for the future, but also for the past 
since the Commission will have to apply the Leipzig-Halle reasoning in investigating potentially 
unlawful aid. 
5.5 Regional infrastructure measures in Germany 
In Germany, the main instrument of domestic regional policy, the Regional Joint Task 
(Gemeinschaftsaufgabe zur Verbesserung der regionalen Infrastruktur, GRW), provides funding for 
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local business-oriented infrastructure (kommunale wirtschaftsnahe Infrastruktur), in addition to direct 
investment aid to individual firms and other types of regional development support, including bottom-
up initiatives. In March 2013 the German authorities notified a series of legal frameworks for GRW 
business-oriented infrastructure measures. The German authorities are seeking to continue to use the 
GRW to provide the following forms of infrastructure funding in Article 107(3)(c) areas in 2014-20 (all 
of which have been funded in 2007-13 and in previous periods): 
x the development and upgrading of industrial and business parks; 
x the construction or extension of transport connections between commercial enterprises or 
business parks and inter/national transport networks; 
x the construction or extension of energy and water supply lines and distribution systems; 
x the construction or extension of communication links (to connect to the existing network or the 
nearest junction), notably broadband, in areas where there is not competition between 
multiple suppliers or where commercial enterprises do not supply infrastructure; 
x the construction or extension of plants for treating or disposing of waste water and waste; 
x the development of business parks for tourism, as well as public tourism facilities; 
x the construction or extension of facilities for vocational training, further education and re-
training; 
x the construction or extension for business centres which provide space and common services 
for small firms for up to five years (or exceptionally for eight years). 
The treatment of the various measures has varied. The Commission has concluded that the following 
do not involve State aid: 146 
x The development and upgrading of industrial and business parks 
x The construction or extension of transport connections between commercial enterprises or 
business parks and inter/national transport networks; 
x The construction or extension of energy and water supply lines and distribution systems. 
The background to and rationale for this decision are outlined in Box 1. 
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Box 1: Commission decision on GRW scheme for industrial and business parks 
The purpose of the scheme is to make the land ready to build on, including decontamination in line with the 
µSROOXWHUSD\V¶SULQFLSOHDQGHQVXUHFRQQHFWLRQVWRutilities and transport networks. Eligible costs are, in particular: 
groundwork for making land ready to build; construction costs for street, street lighting, anti-noise barriers and 
landscaping; connection costs for water, electricity, gas and sewage; environmental protection and 
decontamination, subject to the polluter-pays principle; removal of existing buildings (eg old factories, military 
installations). The measure does not concern funding the construction of buildings or other structure, nor the 
management or administration of land or buildings, but only making the terrain ready to build on. 
The direct recipients of funds are generally local authorities or associations thereof, but can be not-for-profit 
bodies and joint-ventures with commercial enterprises where the majority share is held by local authorities or not-
for-profit bodies. The direct recipients of the funds ± the bodies implementing the projects ± are normally the 
owners of the land. The implementation of the projects can be entrusted to developers through an open, 
transparent and non-discriminatory tender process; the developers may not use the land themselves. The 
Commission considered the potential for aid at three main levels: 
x Bodies implementing the projects: 
x Land development by local authorities: here the Commission concluded that the development the 
revitalisation of public land by local authorities is not an economic activityEXWµSDUWRIWKHLUSXEOLF
tasks, namely the provision and supervision of land in line with local urban and spatial development 
SODQV¶7KHUHVRXUFHVLQYROYHGZHUHWKHUHIRUHDQLQWUDVWDWHWUDQVIHUDQGGLGQRWLQYROYH6WDWHDLG 
x Land development by other entities: in this instance no intrastate transfer is involved, but the 
obligation to refund any possible profits from the subsequent sale of land excludes the possibility of 
an advantage. 
x Land development where the body responsible for implementation is not the owner of the land: the 
owner has to pass on all the benefits from the development, including any increase in value of the 
land, which excludes the possibility of an advantage to the land owner, who is therefore not an aid 
beneficiary. 
x Developers: are engaged in an economic activity, but would always be selected through an open, 
transparent and non-discriminatory public procurement procedure, and therefore not gain an advantage. 
x Purchasers of the land: the land must be sold in accordance with the CommiVVLRQ¶V&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ
land sales,147 thus providing sufficient safeguards that the land is sold at a market price and the 
purchaser does not gain an advantage.  
 
The Commission also found that the financing of specifically-listed non-income generating tourist 
facilities and local income generating tourist facilities did not constitute State aid within the meaning of 
Article 107DQGLVVXHGDµFRPIRUWOHWWHU¶WRWKLVHIIHFW148 There will now be a multi-stage procedure 
for tourism infrastructure, differentiating between a) non-income generating infrastructure, b) 
infrastructure with no supra-regional impact, and c) larger projects which will have to be notified 
individually. In fact, tourism infrastructure was the most problematic area. 
As to the other types of infrastructure, the German authorities have retracted their notifications, on the 
understanding that these will not be regarded as State aid, provided that some changes are made to 
the GRW Coordination Framework conditions (these changes have been duly made), for example: 
x Some additional limits have been put on the types of spending allowed for training 
infrastructure; 
x The types of spending for communications infrastructure has been further limited i.e. there will 
no longer EHDQ\IXQGLQJIRUµJUH\DUHDV¶ 
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Discussions with the Commission on the implications of Leipzig-Halle will now continue outside the 
framework of the GRW. However, the German authorities have been surprised that the Commission 
does not seem to have any methods or criteria for dealing with this issue. Instead, in summer 2014, 
the Commission began assessing individually notified cases. 
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6. DISCUSSION ISSUES 
This paper has provided an overview of the key changes resulting from the adoption of RAG and 
GBER 2014-20, D UHYLHZ RI (R53$ SDUWQHUV¶ DVVLVWHG DUHD PDSV IRU WKH QHZ SHULRG and a 
consideration of some recent developments in the definition of State aid, with particular reference to 
infrastructure. The new RAG and GBER are significant milestones in the evolution of regional aid 
control and give rise to a number of practical and more philosophical issues and questions. At the 
same time, wider definitional questions over the evolving scope of State aid cast uncertainty over the 
legality of measures that have traditionally been part of the regional policy armoury, most notably in 
the field of infrastructure. Against this background, the following questions are posed as starting point 
for discussion. 
(i) How much of a constraint are the new rules on support to ODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDV" 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VRULJLQDO LQWHQWLRQKDGEHHQWRH[FOXGHODUJHILUPVIURPHOLJLELOLW\IRUUHJLRQDO LQ µF¶
areas. This objective was ultimately watered down, enabling certain types of investment by large firms 
to be aided. How far will this possibility be used? Are the definitions sufficiently clear to 
operationalise? Will this take the form of GBER-based aid or notification? If the latter, what concerns 
are there about the compatibility assessment? 
(ii) What is the relevance of the assisted area map in the new context? 
Historically, the negotiation of the assisted area maps has been one of the most contentious aspects 
of the regional aid relations between the Commission and the Member States. The 2014-20 maps 
have been negotiated comparatively swiftly and painlessly. Is this just the result of time pressures, the 
need to adopt the maps and the higher population ceilings, or has the Commission become less 
H[FLVHGRYHUFRYHUDJHQRZWKDWVXSSRUWIRUODUJHILUPVLQµF¶DUHDVLVOLPLWHG" How useful is the map of 
µF¶DUHDV considered to be for domestic policy ± will the higher rates for SMEs be exploited? 
(iii) To what extent are domestLFSROLF\PDNHUVFRQFHUQHGDWWKHODFNRIµKDUGHGJHV¶LQ
the definition of State aid? 
The Leipzig-Halle case has caused considerable uncertainty about the scope for public authorities to 
invest in infrastructure without infringing the State aid rules. To what extent are policymakers content 
ZLWKWKHFXUUHQWVLWXDWLRQ",VWKH&RPPLVVLRQDWWHPSWWRFODULI\WKHµQRWLRQRIDLG¶ LQDQRWLFHKHOSIXO"
Does the widening of the GBER diminish the need for distinguishing between the definition of State 
aid and compatibility? 
(iv) Are the provisions on evaluation to be feared or welcomed? 
The RAG and GBER both contain provisions related to the evaluation of certain aid measures, 
SDUWLFXODUO\ ODUJHRQHV'*&RPSHWLWLRQ¶VVWDIIZRUNLQJSDSHU LPSOLHVDGHJUHHRIKRPRJHQHLW\RYHr 
the approaches to be taken to evaluating regional aid measures. Is this appropriate? To what extent 
should the effectiveness of a measure (as opposed to its competition effects) be a concern of the 
Commission? How might new requirements for evaluation affect policy? 
